# 1NC vs Emory PR

### FTC CP---1NC

#### The United States Congress should increase funding for the FTC specifically tailored for data privacy, scamming, and emerging tech.

#### That solves all of advantage two.

Access Now et al. 21 (November 15th, “Coalition Letter to Congress in Support of Build Back Better Act FTC Provisions,” https://epic.org/documents/coalition-letter-to-congress-in-support-of-build-back-better-act-ftc-provisions/)

The Act’s increased funding for the FTC is pivotal. The Commission is badly understaffed and under-resourced, which limits its ability to address an ever-deepening crisis of exploitative data practices.[1] Allocating $1 billion for data protection and antitrust work and establishing a bureau in the FTC to address privacy, civil rights, and data security matters will go far in addressing these problems. This is particularly critical in light of numerous security breaches that lead to identity fraud, which cost consumers an estimated $13 billion in 2020 alone.[2] A better funded and organized Commission will be better equipped to prevent unfair and deceptive data practices, which disproportionately harm people of color and low-income communities. For example, as the FTC noted in its recent report Serving Communities of Color, people of color are disproportionately affected by fraud.[3]

### Inequality CP---1NC

#### The United States federal government should:

Prohibit Presidential unilateral first use of nuclear weapons

establish a Global Concert for the 21st Century.

And, substantially increase defense spending, including promoting naval deployment, deterrence posture, and new military technology.

#### Plank 1 solves diversionary war.

Blair, 18

(Bruce Blair, nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero, Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority, January/February 2018, Arms Control Today, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/features/strengthening-checks-presidential-nuclear-launch-authority>)

Equally overdue is the adoption of a policy that eschews the first use of nuclear weapons. A clear marker would be established in limiting the president’s leeway to initiate a first strike.17 If taken seriously, the operational plans would also be modified in ways that would hamstring any effort to order the use of nuclear weapons without apparent cause.

Congress has considerable legal standing to pass legislation that prohibits first use. A recent bill introduced by Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) is a step in this direction,18 but a law would draw real redlines around the policy. Crossing them would make the president accountable and even impeachable.

#### Plank 2 solves terminal to LIO.

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The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity.

Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation. A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements, clearly distinguishing it from the UN Security Council. The UNSC serves too often as a public forum for grandstanding and is regularly paralyzed by disputes among its veto-wielding permanent members. In contrast, a concert offers a private venue that combines consensus building with cajoling and jockeying—a must since major powers will have both common and competing interests. By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences.

A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions. This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist. The UN is too big, too bureaucratic, and too formalistic. Fly-in, fly-out G-7 or G-20 summits can be useful but even at their best are woefully inadequate, in part because so much effort goes toward haggling over detailed, but often anodyne, communiqués. Phone calls between heads of state, foreign ministers, and national security advisers are too episodic and often narrow in scope.

Fashioning major-power consensus on the international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises—the Concert of Europe relied on these important innovations to preserve peace in a multipolar world. By drawing on lessons from its nineteenth-century forebearer, a twenty-first-century global concert can do the same. Concerts do lack the certitude, predictability, and enforceability of alliances and other formalized pacts. But in designing mechanisms to preserve peace amid geopolitical flux, policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible.

A GLOBAL CONCERT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and nondemocracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type. The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop.

Members would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters. Although they would not be formal members of the concert, four regional organizations—the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS)—would maintain permanent delegations at the concert’s headquarters. These organizations would provide their regions with representation and the ability to help shape the concert’s agenda. When discussing issues affecting these regions, concert members would invite delegates from these bodies as well as select member states to join meetings. For example, were concert members to address a dispute in the Middle East, they could request the participation of the Arab League, its relevant members, and other involved parties, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey.

A global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus. Like the Concert of Europe, it would privilege the territorial status quo and a view of sovereignty that precludes, except in the case of international consensus, using military force or other coercive tools to alter existing borders or topple regimes. This relatively conservative baseline would encourage buy-in from all members. At the same time, the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty and the potential need to deny sovereign immunity to nations that engage in certain egregious activities. Those activities might include committing genocide, harboring or sponsoring terrorists, or severely exacerbating climate change by destroying rainforests.

#### Plank 3 revitalizes heg.

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Finally, there is the matter of American hard power. What has been true since the time of Rome remains true today: there can be no world order without power to preserve it, to **shape its norms**, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace. Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer problems that it cannot answer or that have no answer. But it is also **essential**. No nation or group of nations that renounced power could expect to maintain any kind of world order. If the United States begins to look like a **less reliable defender** of the present order, that order will **begin to unravel**. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There can be **no stable balance** of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to play the role of providing balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will **buckle under the unrestrained military competition** of regional powers. Today, as a result of the Budget Control Act and a **general unwillingness to spend adequately** on defense, America’s ability to play this vital role is coming increasingly under question. Current defense spending has created a **readiness crisis** within the armed forces. Only a handful of Army brigades are available for use in a crisis. The army is about to be forced to cut 40,000 soldiers from its active force. There are **too few ships** to provide a U.S. presence in the multiple hotspots that have sprouted up around the world. As the bipartisan, congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel has argued, the U.S. military must be able to **deter or stop aggression** in multiple theaters, not just one, even when engaged in a large-scale war. It needs to be able to fight ISIS and deter Iran in the Middle East, deter Russia in Europe and Syria, and in Asia deter North Korea and **maintain stability** in the face of a rising China. Consider the threat now posed by Iran. Whatever one thinks about the recently-concluded nuclear deal, any serious strategy aimed at resisting Iranian domination also requires confronting Iran on the several fronts of the Middle East battlefield. In Syria, it requires a determined policy to remove Iran’s close ally, Basher al-Assad, using U.S. air power to provide cover for civilians and creating a safe zone for Syrians willing to fight. In Iraq, it requires using American forces to push back and destroy the forces of the Islamic State so that we do not have to rely, de facto, on Iranian power to do the job. Overall, it requires a **greater U.S. military commitment** to the region, a reversal of both the perceived and the real withdrawal of American power. And therefore it requires a reversal of the downward trend in U.S. defense spending, which has made it harder for the military even to think about addressing these challenges, should it be called upon to do so.

### T Exemptions---1NC

#### “Expanding scope” requires prohibiting practices that are currently legislatively exempted from antitrust laws

Garubo, citing Supreme Court, 84, Senior Vice President and Corporate Secretary, Commercial Credit Group, Juris Doctor, magna cum laude, from California Western School of Law (Angelo, “Severing the Legislative Veto Provision: The Aftermath of Chada,” *California Western law Review,* 21.1)

A proviso is a clause engrafted on an enactment to restrain or modify the enacting clause or to except from its operation something which otherwise would have been within it. It also acts to exclude or prevent possible grounds of misinterpretation. It is designed to prevent an interpretation which extends that statute to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview.140 By its very nature a veto provision can be considered as a proviso to the rest of the statute. The function of a veto provision is to allow Congress to exercise post enactment control over the executive. 141 It allows them to prevent officials of the executive branch from implementing a statute in a way which is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.142 By "vetoing" an act of the executive branch, Congress could insure that any implementation of a statute was consistent with the purview of that statute. 143 The Department of Education Organization Act' 44 authorized the Secretary of Education, an executive official, to prescribe rules and regulations as he determines are necessary to administer and manage the functions of the department. 145 The statute also contained a veto provision which stated that rules and regulations promulgated under the Act could be disapproved by a concurrent resolution of Congress.146 As this example indicates, veto provisions act as provisos to the main body of a statute by allowing Congress to retain control over the implementation of the statute by the executive branch. Since a veto provision can qualify as a proviso, the rule in Davis v. Wallace 147 and Frost v. Corporation Commission 148 can be applied to show that the legislative intent test is inadequate to determine if a veto provision should be severed. In Davis and Frost, the Supreme Court ruled that a proviso could not be severed if it was originally written into the statute. 149 The Court reasoned that severing such a provision would result in an extension of the scope of the statute.' 50 Such an extension would be contrary to the legislative intent of a statute by including subject matter which the legislature expressly chose to exclude.151 The Davis and Frost analysis can be applied to the "congressional veto" because (1) the veto provision can be considered a proviso 152 and (2) severing a veto provision will expand the scope of the statute contrary to legislative intent. 5 3 By severing a veto provision the executive branch would be free to expand or limit the scope of a statute through its implementation. Such an expansion or limitation would constitute a defacto contradiction of legislative intent by altering the purview of the statute.' 54 A veto provision is a control mechanism.' 55 Its mere presence in a statute indicates the legislature's desire to restrict the scope of that statute. 5 6 By removing it, the court would affect a fundamental change in the nature of the statute, which was not accounted for when the legislature enacted the law. 157 Because a veto provision is a proviso, its excise from a statute would contradict legislative intent. A test which uses legislative intent to determine if a veto provision is severable could only find that the provision is not severable. Thus, when literally applied, the legislative intent test is not adequate to determine if a veto provision should be severed from its statutory framework.

#### VIOLATION---the plan does not reverse a statutory exemption.

#### VOTE NEG:

#### 1---Predictable limits and ground. Any other interp makes “stronger enforcement” topical, which justifies limitless sub-industry of the week and each of which has zero link uniqueness.

#### 2---Precision---Supreme Court definitions are the gold standard [our ev cites Davis v. Wallace and Frost v. Corporation Commission]

#### 2---Resolutional synergy. Our interp gives independent meaning to “scope of laws.”

### Cap K---1NC

#### Anti-trust’s promise of reformed capitalist competition is a ruse to solidify American domination. Western academics erase imperialism from consideration, ensuring anti-trust cases will always hinge on American interests and never consider global impact.

Kwet 22, PhD in Sociology from Rhodes University, visiting professor @ Yale Information Society Project (Michael, The Digital Tech Deal: a socialist framework for the twenty-first century, *Race & Class*, Vol. 63, Issue 3, DOI:10.1177/03063968211064478)

Limitations of liberal and progressive ‘techlash’ reforms

In response to the rise of Big Tech, the intellectual classes in the Global North, led by American scholars, researchers and journalists, have formulated a liberal/progressive critique of Big Tech and a corresponding set of capitalist reforms they call the ‘techlash’. Their framework, informed by progressive-era figures like Louis Brandeis and Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), aims to restore the Golden Age of Capitalism through enlightened state regulation. This circuit of intellectuals are drawn primarily from elite universities (Ivy League, MIT, Stanford, Oxford, etc.) and the corporate media. Money for their research is sourced from elite academia and media outlets, wealthy foundations, philanthropists and Big Tech itself. The techlash critics ignore or downplay the analytical and moral centrality of digital capitalism and colonialism, ecological context and the need for a socialist transformation. A de facto vanguard within the intellectual community tuned into tech, together with Big Tech itself, these elite intellectuals set the bounds of leftist discourse and exercise ‘tech hegemony’ over the broader narrative.37

There are two branches of critique put forth by the American techlashers: a legal branch which focuses on anti-trust as its centrepiece to reform digital capitalism and a human rights branch which focuses on discrimination, privacy, content moderation and workers’ welfare. These intellectuals are typically in agreement with each other and often weave their critiques and solutions together. Let us consider each in turn.

Legal reformers

Within the legal domain, a new wave of anti-trust scholars have occupied centre-stage to address the digital economy.38 At the leftmost end of the spectrum in the United States, ‘neo-Brandeisian’ anti-trust scholars draw inspiration from Louis Brandeis, who viewed a fair and just democracy as one without extreme concentrations of wealth and power into the hands of corporations. Neo-Brandeisians share with socialists the idea that socioeconomic inequality in part springs from the monopoly power of big corporations. However, anti-trust reformers depart from socialists in irreconcilable ways.

For one, they envision a ‘small business capitalism’ of private property owners kept intact by enlightened state regulators. Socialists, by contrast, argue that the capitalist system naturally concentrates wealth and objects to class inequalities and private ownership of the means of production. For another, neo-Brandeisians fetishise competition as a force for social good, rather than a force which pits owners and workers against each other in the battle for revenue, profits and market share.

Critically, the limits of economic growth are not acknowledged anywhere in the literature, nor are digital colonialism and American empire. This is an analytical failure because the fact that Big Tech corporations exercise global dominance should be evaluated in light of their international and environmental impact. It’s as if central features of the global tech economy – American empire and ecological crisis – don’t even exist. It is a moral failure because all parties affected should be involved in formulating and implementing remedies, but, instead, the United States’ scholars, lawmakers, courts and regulators are the ones making critical decisions about reforming American firms with global reach.

European counterparts share in the US anti-trust reformist agenda, with an added caveat: the Europeans are explicitly trying to cut down the American super-giants in order to build their own tech giants and colonise global markets.

In Europe, there are already tens of unicorns (privately held start-ups valued over $1 billion). Rich European countries dominate this race. The UK leads the pack and aims to produce its own trillion-dollar behemoth. President Emanuel Macron will be pumping €5 billion to tech start-ups in hopes that France will have at least twenty-five unicorns by 2025. Germany is attracting billions for its start-ups and spending €3 billion to become a global AI powerhouse and a world leader (i.e., market coloniser) in digital industrialisation. For its part, the Netherlands aims to become a ‘unicorn nation’. In 2021, the European Union’s competition commissioner, Margarethe Vestager, told the press in no uncertain terms that Europe needs to ‘build its own European tech giants’.39

Thus, the notion that European leaders are against Big Tech is demonstrably false. They are trying to shrink the American super-giants (GAFAM) so they can carve out market share for burgeoning European tech giants. It’s pure power politics – an inconvenient truth for America’s neo-Brandeisians, who laud and borrow ideas from their European counterparts.

The new anti-trust scholars erase these realities from within their own self-referential echo chambers, and instead act as if anti-trust is a matter of remedying harms to their own citizens. This is not a small point. Even if anti-trust reforms go through, the space created for new market entrants will almost certainly be dominated by the rich countries, who still have the most advanced engineers and resources to pay them high salaries and poach foreign talent.

#### The American “national economy” can only sustain itself by externalizing the negatives of capitalist growth onto the periphery. Western capitalism is unsustainable, reform only prolongs imperial exploitation, escalating interventionism, and neoliberal austerity.

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To answer these questions, we must come to grips with a key feature of the world economy—one that pundits in the global North tend either to ignore or wish away—namely, the fact that capitalist growth is fundamentally dependent on imperialism. This arrangement, which has persisted now for 500 years in various forms, is beginning to come under significant strain, and climate breakdown is likely to widen the cracks. This opens up opportunities for change, but also poses significant dangers. Everything depends on how governments and social movements choose to respond.

The key thing to grasp is that, under capitalism, “growth” is not about increasing production in order to meet human needs. It is about increasing production in order to extract and accumulate profit. That is the overriding objective. To keep such a system going requires several interventions. First, you have to cheapen the prices of inputs (labor, land, materials, energy, suppliers, etc.) as much as possible, and maintain those prices at a low level. Second, you have to ensure a constantly increasing supply of those cheap inputs. And third, you need to establish control over captive markets that will absorb your output.

Growth along these lines cannot occur within an isolated system. If you place too much pressure on your domestic resource base or your domestic working class, sooner or later you are likely to face a revolution. To avoid such an outcome, capitalism always requires an “outside,” external to itself, where it can cheapen labor and nature with impunity and appropriate them on a vast scale; an outside where it can “externalize” social and ecological damages, where rebellions can be contained, and where it does not have to negotiate with local grievances or demands.

This is where the colonies come in. From the origins of capitalism in the late 15th century, growth in the “core” of the world economy (Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) has always depended on the sabotage of labor and resources in the “periphery”. Consider the silver plundered from the Andes, the sugar and cotton extracted from land appropriated from Indigenous Americans, the grain, rubber, gold and countless other resources appropriated from Asia and Africa, and the mass enslavement and indenture of African and Indigenous people—all of which exacted a staggering human and ecological toll. On top of this, colonizers destroyed local industries and self-sufficient economies wherever they went, in order to establish captive markets. There was no lag between the rise of capitalism and the imperial project. Imperialism was the *mechanism* of capitalist expansion.

As the Indian economists Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik put it, capitalist growth requires an imperial arrangement—not as a side gig but as a *structurally necessary feature*. Imperialism ensures that inputs remain cheap, and thus maintains the conditions for capital accumulation. But it also underpins the fragile inter-class truce that prevails in the core states. If you’re going to raise the real wages of the working classes in the core, or take steps to protect the local ecology, then in order to maintain capital accumulation you have to compensate for this by depressing the costs of labor and nature elsewhere, namely, among workers and producers in the global South. Ever since the rise of the labor movement in the late 19th century, capital’s concessions to the working classes in Europe and the United States have been possible in large part because of imperialism.

This arrangement came under strain in the middle of the 20th century, however, as radical anti-imperialist movements gained traction across the global South. After winning political independence, many Southern governments set about dismantling colonial systems of extraction. They protected their economies and supported their domestic producers using tariffs, subsidies and capital controls; they instituted land reforms; they nationalized key resources and industries; they rolled out public services and improved workers’ wages. This movement was successful in advancing economic sovereignty and improving human development across much of the South. But it also constrained the core’s access to cheap labor and nature, and reduced their control over Southern markets.

The collapse of the imperial arrangement posed a significant threat to Northern capital accumulation. This problem was mitigated for a time by Keynesian policy: massive government expenditure boosted aggregate demand in the global North and generated an extraordinary economic expansion, providing a temporary “fix” for capital. Further concessions to the working classes of the core were sustained under these conditions, permitting the rise of social democracy in some states. But this fix could only hold for so long. As wages rose in the core and the supply price rose in the periphery, growth ground to a halt, capital accumulation became increasingly untenable, and by the mid-1970s the economies of the global North were overcome by a full-blown crisis of stagflation. As it turns out, capitalism cannot function for long under conditions of global justice. Fair wages and decolonization are compatible with a functioning economy, but they are not compatible with a functioning capitalist economy, because they limit the possibility of capital accumulation.

To deal with the crisis of the 1970s, capital needed a way to restore the imperial arrangement, to once again depress Southern prices and regain access to Southern markets. To achieve this, the core states intervened to depose progressive leaders in the global South—including, most prominently, Mossadegh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala, Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Allende in Chile—replacing them with regimes more amenable to Northern economic interests. But the final blow was delivered by the World Bank and the IMF, which during the 1980s and 1990s imposed neoliberal structural adjustment programs (SAPs) across the region. This move shifted control over economic policy from the national parliaments of the South to technocrats in Washington and bankers in New York and London, ending the brief era of economic sovereignty. SAPs dismantled protections on labor and the environment, privatized public goods and cut public spending, reversing the reforms of the anti-colonial movement in one fell swoop.

It worked: wages and prices in the South collapsed under structural adjustment, and the new “free trade” regime allowed Northern capital to shift production abroad in order to take direct advantage of cheap labor and inputs. This enabled a massive increase in the scale and intensity of appropriation from the global South during the 1980s and 1990s, restoring the imperial arrangement and resolving the crisis of capitalism. Those who see neoliberalism as the main problem, and who fantasize about reverting to a less destructive version of capitalist growth, fail to grasp this point. The neoliberal turn was not some kind of mistake; it was necessary to restore the conditions for growth in the core. It was the obligatory next step in capitalist development.

But now, as the 21st century wears on, the engines of imperial appropriation are slowing down again. This reality is evident in the declining rate of economic growth in the core states, which economists have come to refer to as “secular stagnation.” This is happening for several reasons.

First, in the wake of structural adjustment, the collapse of the USSR, and the semi-integration of China, there are few nation-states and territories left that have not been brought into the remit of the capitalist world system. Imperialist expansion has effectively reached the limits of the planet. Now, instead of shifting production to new pools of cheap labor, capital has to deal with the existing workforce and their demands for higher wages. Second, certain regions of the South—specifically China and the leftist states of South America—are managing to push back against imperialism and improve their terms of trade, even while operating within the basic structure of the capitalist economy. All of this is leading to a rising supply price, which spells trouble for capital accumulation — and growth — in the core.

But perhaps most importantly — and this is the clincher — climate change and ecological breakdown are beginning to undermine the conditions of production on the tropical landmass. This is beginning to manifest already, with climate chaos ravaging parts of Central America, the Middle East and North Africa, driving social dislocation and human displacement. Without some kind of dramatic change in direction it will get much worse. With existing policies, we are headed for 2.7 degrees of heating this century, which is likely to trigger multi-breadbasket failure and sustained food supply disruptions across large parts of the global South, displace more than 1.5 billion people, wipe out 30–50% of species, and render much of the tropics uninhabitable for humans.

This is a problem for capital, because growth in the global North depends utterly on production in the global South and depends utterly on Southern land and resources—today just as much as during the colonial period. Recent research finds that rich countries rely on a net appropriation of land equal to twice the size of India, a net appropriation of 10 billion tons of material resources per year, and a net appropriation of embodied labor equivalent to a standing army of 180 million workers. This means that as labor is displaced and disrupted, and as the productive capacity of land is constrained by heatwaves, wildfires, storms and desertification, this will lead to a rising supply price in the core that will trigger a severe crisis for capital—more serious than anything it has yet encountered.

The question is, how will the core states respond? To maintain the rate of growth and capital accumulation in the face of this crisis, they will have to find a way to cut the supply price once again.

There are two obvious possibilities. One option is to cut wages in the core states, shred the welfare system and privatize public services, all of which would help cheapen inputs and open up new frontiers for accumulation, giving some reprieve to capital. This option — domestic neoliberal austerity — was deployed in the US and Britain during the 1980s as part of the response to the initial collapse of the imperial arrangement. Now it is being increasingly taken up by the European social democracies themselves, including the Nordics.

Of course, the risk of this approach is that it could trigger a backlash from the domestic working class, which could coalesce into a socialist revolution. Aware of this danger, politicians will seek to promote anti-immigrant and white nationalist narratives. By directing working-class grievance toward an “other,” this approach gets people to accept their own immiseration, so long as they can feel an affinity with the ruling class on the basis of race, and feel superior to people of colour who are kept in conditions more miserable than their own. This strategy has long been used to support the neoliberal project in the United States, and the ruling classes of the UK and Europe are now also turning to this playbook. Boris Johnson is a master of this in British politics.

The second option is that the core states could double down on imperialism. It is not difficult to imagine new rounds of invasion and occupation intended to force Southern prices back down. The recent coup in Bolivia, backed by the U.S. with its rising appetite for cheap lithium, offers hints of what might come. And it is clear that the Biden administration, just as under Trump before him , is already preparing the grounds for aggression against China, among other things to constrain China’s domestic demand for resources. Imperialist interventions that cheapen the supply price would allow capitalists in the global North to maintain accumulation and sustain their truce with the working classes of the core for a little while longer, even as the world crumbles around them.

#### The alternative is a worker’s international.

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The International of Workers and Peoples

Although untold numbers of people are engaged in innumerable struggles against the capitalist juggernaut in their specific localities all around the world, struggles for substantive equality, including battles over race, gender, and class, depend on the fight against imperialism at the global level. Hence, there is a need for a new global organization of workers based on the model of Marx’s First International.48 Such an International for the twenty-first century cannot simply consist of a group of elite intellectuals from the North engaged in World Social Forum-like discussion activities or in the promotion of social-democratic regulatory reforms as in the so-called Socialist and Progressive Internationals. Rather, it needs to be constituted as a workers-based and peoples-based organization, rooted from the beginning in a strong South-South alliance so as to place the struggle against imperialism at the center of the socialist revolt against capitalism, as contemplated by figures such as Chávez and Amin.

In 2011, just prior to his final illness, Chávez was preparing, following his next election, to launch what was to be called the New International (pointedly not a Fifth International) focusing on a South-South alliance and giving a global significance to socialism in the twenty-first century. This would have extended the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America to a global level.49 This, however, never saw the light of day due to Chávez’s rapid decline and untimely death.

Meanwhile, a separate conception grew out of the efforts of Amin, working with the World Forum for Alternatives. Amin had long contemplated a Fifth International, an idea he was still presenting as late as May 2018. But in July 2018, only a month before his death, this had been transformed into what he called an Internationale of Workers and Peoples, explicitly recognizing that a pure worker-based International that did not take into account the situation of peoples was inadequate in confronting imperialism.50 This, he stated, would be an organization, not just a movement. It would be aimed at the

alliance of all working peoples of the world and not only those qualified as representatives of the proletariat…including all wage earners of the services, peasants, farmers, and the peoples oppressed by modern capitalism. The construction must also be based on the recognition and respect of diversity, whether of parties, trade unions, or other popular organizations of struggle, guaranteeing their real independence.… In the absence of [such revolutionary] progress the world would continue to be ruled by chaos, barbarian practices, and the destruction of the earth.51

The creation of a New International cannot of course occur in a vacuum but needs to be articulated within and as a product of the building of unified mass organizations expanding at the grassroots level in conjunction with revolutionary movements and delinkings from the capitalist system all over the world. It could not occur, in Amin’s view, without new initiatives from the Global South to create broad alliances, as in the initial organized struggles associated with the Third World movement launched at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the struggle for a New International Economic Order.52 These three elements—grassroots movements, delinking, and cross-country/cross-continent alliances—are all crucial in his conception of the anti-imperialist struggle. Today this needs to be united with the global ecological movement.

Such a universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism, Amin insisted, must be characterized by audacity and more audacity, breaking with the coordinates of the system at every point, and finding its ideal path in the principle of from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s need, as the very definition of human community. Today we live in a time of the perfect coincidence of the struggles for freedom and necessity, leading to a renewed struggle for freedom as necessity. The choice before us is unavoidable: ruin or revolution.

### T Per Se---1NC

#### T Prohibition

#### “Prohibition” requires a declaration of per se illegality

Loevinger 61 (Honorable Lee Loevinger- Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. “THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW” , *Section of Antitrust Law* , 1961, Vol. 19, PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, AUGUST 7 THROUGH 11, 1961 (1961), pp. 245-251, JSTOR accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 9/13/21)

Running through the history of antitrust law are two contrapuntal themes: A prohibition of restraint of trade and a principle lately called the "rule of reason" which limits the prohibition. The legal rule against restraint of trade began in the 15th century in cases holding that a contract by which a man agreed not to practice his trade or profession was illegal.1 However, in the course of development of the common law, it became established that agreements which were ancillary to the sale or transfer of a trade or business and which were limited so as to impose a restriction no greater than reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser's interest.2

Thus, when the Sherman Act incorporated the common-law principles on this subject into federal statutory law 3 by adopting the concept of restraint of trade, it presumably imported both the principle that restrictions on competition are illegal and also the principle that in some circumstances a showing of reasonableness will legalize restrictions on competition. Nevertheless, when the question was first presented to the United States Supreme Court under the Sherman Act, it was clearly held (despite later disavowals4 ) that the justification of reasonableness was not available as a defense to a combination which had the effect of restraining trade.' Indeed, it was intimated that the question of reasonableness was not open to the courts in these actions at common law.6 However, when the Court reviewed this matter in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,7 it said in fairly explicit terms both that the Sherman Act prohibited only contracts or acts which unreasonably restrained competition and that the standard of reasonableness had been applied to all restraints of trade at the common law. The Court's assertion is somewhat weakened by the fact that it construed the rule of reason not as applying a standard for judging the character or consequences of the challenged conduct, but as a technique involving the application of human intelligence, or reason, to the problem of making a judgment about whether the conduct does restrain trade.'

#### The aff violates---they create a new legal standard for courts to decide whether a practice is “unreasonable” based on weighing effects

#### VOTE NEG---Balancing tests devastate core links because they allow the practice when it’s beneficial. AND, creates a moving target, because the disallowed behavior is context-dependent.

## Inequality ADV

### Hegemony Bad---1NC

#### Slow growth is good---it causes peaceful accession to great power parity. Boosting growth causes a violent cling to power and transition conflicts.

Taliaferro et al. 18, Jeffrey Taliaferro: Professor of political science @ Tufts University. Steven Lobell: University of Utah. Norrin Ripsman: Lehigh University (Is Peaceful Change in World Politics Always Desirable? A Neoclassical Realist Perspective, *International Studies Review*, DOI: 10.1093/isr/viy023)

Conflict between hegemon and challenger can take many forms, ranging in intensity from a sustained rivalry for geopolitical influence in one or more geographic regions to a major or hegemonic war. Again, we narrowly defined peaceful change as a process in which the hegemon voluntarily cedes its dominant geopolitical role to a challenger in one or more geographic regions. This may entail the hegemon withdrawing its military forces and forward bases from a region, renegotiating, or modifying alliances and economic agreements with regional states, often at the behest of the challenger. It is important to note that peaceful change might occur in one locale, while conflict might occur simultaneously in another locale. Lastly, the likelihood of either of the two outcomes—conflict and peaceful transition— depends upon the grand strategic adjustments by the hegemon as well as the challenger.

Neoclassical Realist Theory of Peaceful Change

Our neoclassical realist theory purports to explain the conditions under which a regional or global hegemon will concede some or all of the challenger’s demands without contest. Like all neoclassical realist theories, our theory assumes that all states respond to the international constraints and opportunities they face but that how they respond will be shaped by their domestic constraints (Rose 1988; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016).

Our argument is that peaceful change is only likely in one of three circumstances: (1) when the hegemon’s foreign policy executive (FPE) has high confidence that change is inevitable because it lacks the military, political, or economic capabilities to resist it; or (2) when the political and economic costs of resisting that change are anticipated to be prohibitively high; or (3) when the FPE is domestically constrained in its ability to extract and mobilize the resources to resist the challenger. Each of these three propositions is a sufficient condition for the hegemon to accept peaceful change. They combine to make a necessary condition for peaceful change; that is, unless one or more of them is obtained, the hegemon will resist peaceful change. In this section, we unpack the logic underlying each of these propositions.

The dependent variable (DV) is the pattern of strategic adjustment by the hegemon. A hegemon has two broad strategic choices in response to a rising challenger: it can accept peaceful transition, or it can resist it.7 Resistance entails a variety of strategies, ranging from containment to preventive war. Economically, the hegemon might deny the challenger access to its markets, use sanctions, employ exchange and currency controls, and more broadly isolate the challenger from trade to undermine the economic base for its military power. Militarily, the hegemon could forge alliances with states along the challenger’s periphery, dramatically augment its own defense spending, sabotage the challenger’s weapons programs, seek to embroil the challenger’s armed forces in costly proxy conflicts, or, in the extreme, initiate a preventive war (Copeland 2000; Levy 2008, 2011).

A strategy of peaceful transition (or retrenchment) entails the strategic reorientation away from confrontation with a challenger. The hegemon, acknowledging the inevitability of the power transition, scales back its military deployments and alliance commitments, relaxes or removes economic sanctions targeting the challenger, and cedes its leadership role to the challenger in formerly contested regions (MacDonald and Parent 2011, 11–13).

The three propositions we derive from the theory specify the combinations of neoclassical realism’s systemic-level independent variables (IVs) and domestic-level intervening variables (IVVs) that increase the likelihood that a hegemon will pursue a resistance strategy or a peaceful transition strategy.

Proposition 1 (the inevitability of international change) relates directly to three IVs: the relative distribution of power, the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a particular region, and the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. Hegemons that enjoy an overall power advantage over rising challengers are unlikely to see a future power transition as inevitable. Hegemons experiencing relative decline or those that are simply at a marked disadvantage in one or more categories of power vis-à-vis a challenger, however, are more likely to conclude that a power transition is inevitable.

The second IV is the nature of the strategic environment that a hegemon confronts in a contested region. A state’s strategic environment refers to the magnitude and the imminence of the external threats and opportunities that it faces at any given time. All other things being equal, the more imminent and dangerous the threat or the more fleeting and enticing the opportunity, the more restrictive a state’s strategic environment will be. Conversely, the more remote and less intense the threat or the more enduring and less enticing the opportunity, the more permissive a state’s strategic environment will be. Restrictive and permissive strategic environments exist along a continuum (Ripsman et al. 2016, 52–53).

Regional hegemons exercise geopolitical dominance over a single region. A global hegemon, by definition, has wide interests across several regions of the globe. Consequently, they can confront different strategic environments across different regions. An increase or a decrease in a challenger’s economic, political, or military penetration of a contested region, up to and including the conquest of all or part of that region, can shift the strategic environment the hegemon faces from permissive to restrictive or vice versa (Taliaferro 2018). Where a global hegemon faces a restrictive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that the competitor will challenge its leadership in the locale and that a power transition is inevitable. Conversely, where it faces a permissive strategic environment in a contested region, it is more likely to conclude that a power transition is not inevitable.

The third IV is the degree of systemic clarity regarding threats and opportunities. The degree of systemic clarity involves the signals or information that states receive from the international system or a regional sub-system. Systemic clarity has three subcomponents: (1) the extent to which external threats or opportunities can be readily identified, (2) whether the international system provides information about the time horizon in which those threats or opportunities will materialize, and (3) whether there is an “optimal” strategic response (Ripsman et al. 2016, 46–47).

The logic here is that if the hegemon judges that it has no alternatives to prevent a power transition, it would be irrational to waste resources resisting the inevitable. In general, hegemons have different strategic options for countering challengers in the short- and long-run. In the short-run, a hegemon can balance internally by increasing its armaments or externally by seeking allies. Over the longer turn, it has more options. Economic growth and emulation can redress relative decline. Nonetheless, if the hegemon’s leadership calculates that it lacks the resources for economic growth and emulation over the longer term, and they also calculate that the rising challenger’s economic growth will likely continue indefinitely, they might conclude resistance is futile. For instance, by 1901, recognizing the United States’ ascendency, Britain ceded leadership over the Western hemisphere by signing the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (Lobell 2003, 70–71). In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the depth of the Soviet Union’s relative economic decline made it impossible to continue competing with the United States. Gorbachev scaled back military commitments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and began to make unilateral concessions in nuclear and conventional arms control (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000, 33).

Proposition 2 (costs of resistance) relates to both internal and external factors, or neoclassical realism’s IVs and IVVs.8 In the first instance, the costs required to contain a challenger will depend on the external environment. The hegemon will need to assess the balance of power and what degree of military and economic resources the challenger can commit to the theater under threat. If these resources far exceed the aggregate resources available at the hegemon’s disposal or are in danger of “breaking the bank,” then the costs will be deemed too high.9 If these requirements do not exceed national power resources, the hegemon will next need to assess whether committing these resources to containing the challenger in the theater in question would undermine its ability to resist other challengers in other important regions. In the 1930s, for example, Britain faced challengers in multiple theaters: Germany threatened British interests in Western Europe, Italy threatened British interests in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and Japan threatened British interests in East and Southeast Asia (Kennedy 1987; Lobell 2003, 85–122; Ripsman and Levy 2008).

#### U.S. hegemony provokes blowback aggression due to status insecurity and dooms global governance---decline spurs a great power concert that solves war and existential threats.

Pampinella 19, Stephenis Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz (Stephen, January 23rd, “The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy,” *The Disorder of Things*, <https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/>, Accessed 10-25-2021)

Why Liberal Internationalism Will Fail (Again)

But in recent weeks, mainstream US foreign policy experts have provided their own spin in progressive internationalism. Advocates and practitioners of a traditional hegemonic foreign policy have sought to co-opt progressive internationalism in a series of essays which argue for the necessity of American power and global influence. These writers embody the post-Cold War centrist foreign policy coalition of liberal internationalists and neoconservatives. For them, that the greatest threat to the democratic “free” world created by the United States remains the autocratic governance model of Russia and China. While Washington should pursue cooperation on transnational governance issues where possible, they argue it cannot do so at the expense of making security concessions which would reward revisionist behavior by great power rivals. As in the past, American exceptionalism remains the identity narrative justifying a return to US hegemony, with Anglo-American norms serving as the basis for hegemonic socialization and cooperation.

The internationalist disposition is a reminder of why a mere social democratic twist on US hegemony will fail to provide actual security for the United States and its allies. Establishment voices continue to rely on state-centric assumptions about IR and ignore how state identities and interests are a function of their relationship with each other. Or, as Jennifer Mitzen and Michelle Murray might argue, the revisionist intentions of Russia and China are a product of their ontological insecurity. A hegemonic United States defending an Anglo-American order denies them recognition of their own great power identities and their right to participate in all deliberations about global order. From this perspective, we should challenge the implicit assumption made by Anthony Blinken and Robert Kagan that Russia is revisionist by nature. An internationalist perspective suggests that Russia has adopted those intentions in relation to a Wilsonian United States which seeks domination over Moscow and the transformation of its political system. The same is true for China, which rejects being cast as a “responsible stakeholder” by Washington which would eventually accept democracy following its internal transformation by global capitalism. In other words, the very terms of US relations with these states over the past 25 years is the source of their revisionist intentions, and not some essentialized feature of their domestic politics.

Further, a liberal exceptionalist narrative that contrasts “Eastern autocracy” with “Western freedom” masks how the United States has perpetuated its own systems of illiberal dominance throughout its history. Those same structures of oppression are the greatest threat to contemporary US democracy and also serve as glaring evidence of US hypocrisy. In his defense of American exceptionalism, Jake Sullivan represents institutional racism as a bug rather than a feature of the American political system by emphasizing the liberal ideals of the Founders and casting Donald Trump’s white ethnonationalism as an aberration. But this telling of the American story whitewashes the long history of an exclusive, white ethnic US identity dating back to the early 19th Century and its role in generating the modern United States. Scholars of American political development and US history have long demonstrated that institutions of slavery and land conquest constituted US society and made possible its economic prosperity rather than some kind of intrinsic tendency toward freedom.

Fast-forward to the present: liberal exceptionalism further denies how economic globalization made possible the rise of authoritarianism. Nils Gilman and David Klion rightly argue that the kleptocratic alliance between autocrats and oligarchs is the true threat to democracy and rule of law. Their ability to concentrate political and economic power has been enabled by the emergence of an integrated global market that privileges the freedom of capital over the needs of ordinary people, one created by the United States when liberal internationalism went global after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Finally, attempts to revive US hegemony will doom transnational efforts to deal with existential non-state threats. Hegemonists like Thomas Wright argue that Russia and China are the greatest threat to the United States, and that Washington should never make concessions to either power as a means of ensuring cooperation on issues of global governance. However, “ring-fencing” global capitalism and climate change as separate issues will fail to achieve the necessary level of cooperation to cope with these threats. National security policymakers cannot recognize that the greatest dangers faced by US citizens are non-state economic and ecological global processes that shape domestic politics from the inside-out, and not rival sovereigns. Economic destitution to the point of embracing fascist dictators coupled with environmental collapse are near-certain non-state threats which transcend our boundaries – in fact, as a global power, the United States has been complicit in creating them.

The internationalist disposition would suggest that the priorities of US foreign policy must change. Regulating global processes should be the primary objective, and it requires that the United States pursue intense macro-levels of cooperation with all other states, including its rivals, to achieve them. Yet it will be unlikely to do so if it remains wedded to liberal hegemony and consumed by great power competition. Short-term incentives to accumulate resources and power will override the long-term need for global governance. The result will be a world whose people live in precarity, ravaged by climate change, and constantly on the verge of great power war.

From “Disposition” to “Grand Strategy”

The internationalist disposition clearly illustrates why old US strategies are incompatible with the progressive internationalism of the US left. However, contra Colás, progressives should not avoid developing of a positive vision for foreign policy due to the diverse range of radical perspectives. To do so would cede pro-restraint arguments to structural realist and libertarian advocates of offshore balancing who offer no template for global engagement or institutional cooperation. What progressives must do is articulate a grand strategy, or a plan that mobilizes all elements of national power and influence, grounded in a relationalist ontology that combines restraint with internationalism. This strategy must be post-hegemonic (a term even Ikenberry has flirted with), post-statist, and supportive of intense international cooperation based on the diversity of identities and values otherwise ignored by the universalist pretenses of Anglo-American liberalism. If our very existence is mutually dependent on others, then we need a foreign policy based on solidarity in response to collectively experienced threats.

I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.

Security and The Balance of Power

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

#### Global governance checks emerging tech, pandemics, and war---extinction.

Bailey 18, Professional technologist and strategic manager. Robert earned his Master of Science Degree in Computer science in 2009, and has worked since then has a product engineer developing Microsoft stack technologies. (Robert, 9-5-201, "Why do we need global governance?" *Global Governance*, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/)

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.

The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3

We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier.

There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4

Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways - we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves.

Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

#### China’s rise is motivated by status---misdiagnosing them as an inherently revisionist state in need of containment makes them more aggressive and causes war.

Murray 19, Associate Professor of Political Studies; Director of Global Initiatives @ Bard College. PhD in International Relations @ University of Chicago (Michelle, The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers, *Oxford University Press*, pp. 207-215)

Identity, Insecurity, and China’s Place in the World

China’s view of, and future place in, the international order are importantly connected to its experiences during the Century of Humiliation and the dual concepts of national humiliation and national rejuvenation that constitute its self-understanding. The Century of Humiliation began with the first Opium War in 1839, when Britain forced China to open its ports to the opium trade, and did not end until the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war of 1949. During this time, China was the target of repeated international interventions, lost large pieces of its territory to Western powers and Japan, saw the collapse of its millennia old imperial system, and was torn apart by internal uprisings.44 According to the national humiliation narrative, the first Opium War represents a distinct turning point in Chinese history, when a powerful and successful ancient civilization was forced into a semi-colonial position at the hands of foreign interventions. National humiliation is an active part of contemporary Chinese collective identity. It serves as an important resource for those cultivating Chinese nationalism, unifying the Chinese people against foreign others who perpetrated these past humiliations and legitimating the CCP, the party seen as leading China’s reemergence as a major power.

The Century of Humiliation, however, is not just about recounting a particular interpretation of the past. Rather, it actively informs beliefs about how the world works and is used to interpret the dynamics of international relations today.45 Specifically, the national humiliation narrative constructs China’s self-understanding and its place in the international system, shaping its interests and aspirations as a rising power. First, the narrative of national humiliation represents China as a victim of Western subjugation. When articulated in the context of current international relations, this representation works to breed suspicion of outside actors, including the United States, and gives an emotional valence to seemingly inconsequential interactions. For example, in 2001 a US spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, sparking an international incident and inflaming tensions between China and the United States. As the incident played itself out, it became apparent that “resolving this problem did not involve military retaliation or economic reparations so much as symbolic recognition: China demanded a public apology from the United States.”46 Thus, understood through the prism of national humiliation, interactions with the West are always contextualized in a history where China suffered humiliating losses at the hands of Western expansion, and where Western power is, in and of itself, the instrument of that subjugation.

Second, the narrative of national humiliation constructs Chinese understandings of its military power and that of the United States by imposing a moral subtext to power politics. Building from its treatment during the Century of Humiliation, the international community’s actions toward China are viewed as unjust, reinforcing suspicion of foreign powers’ intentions.47 Within this frame, a self–Other dynamic is created, whereby Chinese history is reimagined as one of benevolent hegemony, when China governed and projected its influence in peaceful ways. This is positioned in contrast to the use of force and coercion common to Western hegemony. Today these self–Other representations guide Chinese understandings about the purpose and meaning of Chinese and American power. In China’s eyes, its burgeoning military power is consistent with its history and thus is not threatening. These representations are at work in Chinese rhetoric that characterizes its growing power as its “peaceful rise.” As Zheng Bijan argued, China’s rise will be different than that of previous major powers, as “China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world.”48 At the same time, US foreign policy is contextualized within this narrative by reference to Western aggression during the Century of Humiliation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has more forcefully criticized China’s human rights record, undermined its bid to host the 2000 Olympics, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and strengthened its presence in the region.49 While US foreign policy has been couched in the language of engagement, many in China view this as a simple euphemism for containment.50 This is especially the case with the Obama administration’s recent “strategic rebalancing,” known popularly as the “pivot to Asia.” As a consequence, any attempt by the United States to contain or limit Chinese power is seen as an act of misrecognition and an unjust and aggressive attempt to subjugate China once again.

Finally, the narrative of national humiliation highlights China’s “historical experience with territorial loss and intrusion,” thus placing the maintenance of sovereignty at the center of China’s national identity.51 The Century of Humiliation is understood to be representative of a loss of sovereignty, where outside forces were able to expose the state’s weakness and delegitimize its institutions. Therefore, any perceived infringement of China’s sovereignty is read through the lens of national humiliation and understood to be an existential threat to China’s security. Importantly, these threats are not material in nature, for China’s physical security is not in doubt. Rather, they represent a symbolic threat, suggesting that China continues to be vulnerable to outside influence. Moreover, sovereignty is the cornerstone of the current international order. Thus any perceived violation of sovereignty is understood to be another subjugation of China, refusing it the rights and privileges that other states in the system enjoy.

This narrative of national humiliation operates alongside the goal of national rejuvenation, which provides the motivation for China’s contemporary foreign policy interests. If national humiliation recounts the losses China suffered at the hands of the West and Japan, national rejuvenation promises to restore for China the status it lost during the Century of Humiliation. In articulating China’s self-understanding in these terms, China’s major power status is understood as a right: respect that China should regain by virtue of its former status as a great nation.52 Thus, China’s rise to major power status is not about obtaining something new or a gaining an advantage over others, but rather as a “restoration of fairness.”53 These discourses of humiliation and rejuvenation infuse Chinese foreign policy, shaping a range of behaviors from its voting record in the United Nations Security Council to its regional relationships to its burgeoning leadership role in the global economy.

Constructing China’s (Un)Peaceful Rise

China’s rise, guided by the twin narratives of national humiliation and rejuvenation, is likely inevitable. What this means for the international order will be a function of China’s interactions with the United States and the representations that animate that relationship. US foreign policy toward a rising China is often cast as a choice between engagement and containment. So-called “optimists” call for increased engagement by integrating China deeply into the global economy and institutional architecture of the international order, whereas “pessimists” see future security competition as an inevitable outgrowth of Chinese power and advocate a policy of containment.54 Both containment and engagement strategies, however, are built off of assumptions about China’s material needs and do not pay sufficient attention to China’s distinct identity needs. Thus, both approaches risk exacerbating China’s dilemma of social insecurity, and constructing China’s unpeaceful rise.

Proponents of containment do not have a sanguine view of China’s rise and argue that as China grows more powerful it is likely to lead to an intense security competition with the United States.55 Containment is a straightforward application of realist understandings of international politics, and presumes that under all conditions China will seek to overturn the international order and thus its power must be preemptively checked. China is motivated, as are all emerging major powers, by security and the related desire for power. In this view, the anarchic structure of international system forces states seeking only security to behave aggressively toward one another in an attempt to gain more power and alter the international status quo. Rising powers are revisionist powers.56 China’s economic power and influence will be the springboard for military dominance in the region because economic power is the basis of military power. China is building a blue-water navy that will allow it to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast “from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force.”57 Moreover, China’s integration in regional politics is indicative of its growing influence. As it becomes less susceptible to American economic pressure, China will have increasing leverage over weaker Asian countries and the United States.58 In short, while China is not in a position to militarily challenge the United States at the present, a much more powerful China should be expected to take increasing steps to push the United States out of the Asia–Pacific region and challenge the terms of the US-led international order.59 Therefore, US foreign policy must be reoriented to contain the impending threat that China poses to the United States’ security and economic interests.

Containment, however, is based on the faulty assumption that China harbors revisionist intentions. It is not an impartial assessment of actual Chinese objectives and therefore runs a real risk of producing a self-fulfilling prophecy.60 The more militarily aggressively the United States behaves, the more threatened China will feel and thus the more likely it will be to respond aggressively to the United States. A potentially severe security dilemma is almost certain to emerge and intensify through a containment strategy, therefore reproducing international relations’ fraught history with power transitions. Moreover, containment is a deterrent strategy, designed to raise the costs of Chinese expansionism and in doing so to limit Chinese power. Deterrent strategies assume that revisionist intentions emerge within states—not from their interactions with other states, and thus ignore China’s recognition-needs. But, as the struggle for recognition highlights, treating a socially insecure state as if it were greedy will only exacerbate its insecurity, fuel its interest in revisionism, and construct China’s unpeaceful rise.

#### Otherwise, status competition goes nuclear---SCS and ECS provocations escalate and draw in great powers. Letting China peacefully surpass the U.S. is the only way to avoid war.

Heath 18, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND (Timothy, February 2nd, “The Competition for Status Could Increase the Risk of a Military Clash in Asia,” *RAND*, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-competition-for-status-could-increase-the-risk.html>, Accessed 09-05-2021)

The United States and its allies and partners rightfully seek to protect their interests by bolstering their respective positions, even as they continue to cooperate with China. The strategy may succeed, but at its core is the assumption that stability can best be gained if China continues to acquiesce to the international order as established after World War II by the United States and its allies. China's conviction that its security depends on changes to this order sets up a deep, structural contradiction that is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Beijing can accordingly be expected to persist in peaceful methods to supplant the United States as Asia's leader. If, however, Beijing at some point concludes that the United States and its allies have successfully stymied its aspirations, China may be tempted by riskier methods to assert its status. A precedent for such behavior may be seen in a rising Germany of the 1890s-1900s. Convinced that it had been denied a status befitting its national power by Britain and France, Germany provoked a series of militarized crises around the world. In 1906, Germany threatened war against France after the two feuded about influence over Morocco. And in a second Moroccan crisis five years later, Germany extracted colonial concessions after it deployed a gunboat in response to a French military intervention. In China's case, brinksmanship behavior could be carried out in the contested East or South China Seas with military ships and aircraft. Already, a growing literature by Chinese military writers recommends the skillful exploitation of military crises for strategic gain.

Brinksmanship carries its own risks, of course. Miscalculation could lead to unwanted war. The strategic effects could be severe as well. Rivals like the United States, Japan, and India could be alarmed enough by a clash that they step up military preparations, aggravating China's security situation. Moreover, conflict could imperil China's grand Belt and Road Initiative ambition, if aggrieved neighbors opt out and welcome investments by Japan and India instead. China has many good reasons to never consider military provocations against a neighbor. But Beijing also has compelling reasons to increase the country's standing and diminish that of the United States and its allies. Given that the ruling Chinese Communist Party has staked its reputation towards that end, China's leaders should be expected to consider all available options to achieve it.

### Inequality---1NC

#### No diversionary war---rhetoric solves.

* Evidence on diversionary war is mixed at best
* They use hostile rhetoric instead of war to have their cake and eat it too – achieves same benefits without conflict
* Prefer our study because it’s based on 50,000 US diplomatic events classified by interstate interactions across economic crises

Carter 18, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. (Erin Baggott, 08/29/18, “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010”, www.erinbcarter.org/documents/diversionUS.pdf]

There is a large literature on diversionary conflict in international relations, but it focuses on material conflicts like militarized interstate disputes rather than foreign policy rhetoric. It is based in social identity theory, which suggests that leaders can increase ingroup affinity by making intergroup distinctions more salient (Closer, 1950; Simmel, 1955; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary conflict is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed” (Baum and Potte r, 2008, 48). Several studies find evidence of diversionary aggression in US foreign policy (Clark, 2003; DeRouen, 2000; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Fordham, 1998a, 6; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; James and Hristoulas, 1994; James and Oneal, 1991; Levy, 1989«,fc; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986) and elsewhere (Bennett, 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt, 1000; Davies, 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; Gelpi, 1997; Heldt, 1999; Lebow, 1981; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Tir, 2006; Russett, 1990; Sobek, 2007; Tir, 2010). Yet skeptics have amassed opposing evidence (Chiozza and Gormans, 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Gowa, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik, 2000, 2004; Meeraik and Waterman, 1996; Moore and Lanoue, 2003; Potter, 2007). Some cases are hard to reconcile with the theory: in Britain, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, and Kosovo wars (Lai and Reiter, 2005). Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth” (Meernik and Waterman, 1996).

Others have developed scope conditions for diversionary aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), when leaders are accountable (Carter, 2018; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking troubled adversaries (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Miller, 1999). Diversion appears more likely to produce a rally when supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004), when the White House draws attention to a dispute (Baker and Oneal, 2001), and in conditions of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years, and first terms (Colaresi, 2007). Most recently, scholars have asked whether diversion occurs outside democracies. They find some autocracies, especially single party regimes, divert as well (Carter, 2018; Pickering and Kisangani, 2011).

This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity, then it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes. While it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk.

To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405).

The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, when the economy deteriorates, leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore the political capital necessary for them to govern. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders.

I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset, an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material cooperation, and material conflict. This is by far the most historically extensive event dataset. As such, it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises.

I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy. First, I establish that US presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words, not deeds. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times.

This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit.

Second, this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation, leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility. In this sense, leaders may have their cake and eat it too: They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis. The mixed empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature may be partly due to the fact that existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes. It is possible that a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels, such as the rhetorical hostility documented in this paper.1

**\*\*\*BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

In the language of the foreign policy substitutability literature (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom and Reed, 2008; Most and Starr, 1984, 1989; Oakes, 2012), rhetorical hostility, like the development of new economic policies, may be seen as a substitute for diversionary conflict.

**\*\*\*END FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

## FTC ADV

### Turn---1NC

#### Three independent link turns to the ADV.

#### 1---resources:

#### The plan makes the lives of enforcement authorities impossible! Every single action would be infinitely be more complicated.

Manne 17, JD @ U Chicago, president and founder of the International Center for Law and Economics, served as a lecturer in law at the University of Chicago Law School and the University of Virginia School of Law. He practiced antitrust law and appellate litigation at Latham & Watkins, clerked for Hon. Morris S. Arnold on the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, and worked as a research assistant for Judge Richard Posner. He was also once (very briefly) employed by the FTC. (Geoffrey, “THE ANTITRUST LAWS ARE NOT SOME META-LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING WHATEVER REGULATION ACTIVISTS WANT: LABOR MARKET EDITION,” Lawson Center, <https://laweconcenter.org/resource/the-antitrust-laws-are-not-some-meta-legislation-authorizing-whatever-regulation-activists-want-labor-market-edition/>)

In this entry, Steinbaum takes particular aim at the US enforcement agencies, which he claims do not consider monopsony power in merger review (and other antitrust enforcement actions) because their current consumer welfare framework somehow doesn’t recognize monopsony as a possible harm. This will probably come as news to the agencies themselves, whose Horizontal Merger Guidelines devote an entire (albeit brief) section (section 12) to monopsony, noting that: Mergers of competing buyers can enhance market power on the buying side of the market, just as mergers of competing sellers can enhance market power on the selling side of the market. Buyer market power is sometimes called “monopsony power.” \* \* \* Market power on the buying side of the market is not a significant concern if suppliers have numerous attractive outlets for their goods or services. However, when that is not the case, the Agencies may conclude that the merger of competing buyers is likely to lessen competition in a manner harmful to sellers. Steinbaum fails to mention the HMGs, but he does point to a US submission to the OECD to make his point. In that document, the agencies state that The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) [] do not consider employment or other non-competition factors in their antitrust analysis. The antitrust agencies have learned that, while such considerations “may be appropriate policy objectives and worthy goals overall… integrating their consideration into a competition analysis… can lead to poor outcomes to the detriment of both businesses and consumers.” Instead, the antitrust agencies focus on ensuring robust competition that benefits consumers and leave other policies such as employment to other parts of government that may be specifically charged with or better placed to consider such objectives. Steinbaum, of course, cites only the first sentence. And he uses it as a launching-off point to attack the notion that antitrust is an improper tool for labor market regulation. But if he had just read a little bit further in the (very short) document he cites, Steinbaum might have discovered that the US antitrust agencies have, in fact, challenged the exercise of collusive monopsony power in labor markets. As footnote 19 of the OECD submission notes: Although employment is not a relevant policy goal in antitrust analysis, anticompetitive conduct affecting terms of employment can violate the Sherman Act. See, e.g., DOJ settlement with eBay Inc. that prevents the company from entering into or maintaining agreements with other companies that restrain employee recruiting or hiring; FTC settlement with ski equipment manufacturers settling charges that companies illegally agreed not to compete for one another’s ski endorsers or employees. (Emphasis added). And, ironically, while asserting that labor market collusion doesn’t matter to the agencies, Steinbaum himself points to “the Justice Department’s 2010 lawsuit against Silicon Valley employers for colluding not to hire one another’s programmers.” Steinbaum instead opts for a willful misreading of the first sentence of the OECD submission. But what the OECD document refers to, of course, are situations where two firms merge, no market power is created (either in input or output markets), but people are laid off because the merged firm does not need all of, say, the IT and human resources employees previously employed in the pre-merger world. Does Steinbaum really think this is grounds for challenging the merger on antitrust grounds? Actually, his post suggests that he does indeed think so, although he doesn’t come right out and say it. What he does say — as he must in order to bring antitrust enforcement to bear on the low- and unskilled labor markets (e.g., burger flippers; retail cashiers; Uber drivers) he purports to care most about — is that: Employers can have that control [over employees, as opposed to independent contractors] without first establishing themselves as a monopoly—in fact, reclassification [of workers as independent contractors] is increasingly standard operating procedure in many industries, which means that treating it as a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act should not require that outright monopolization must first be shown. (Emphasis added). Honestly, I don’t have any idea what he means. Somehow, because firms hire independent contractors where at one time long ago they might have hired employees… they engage in Sherman Act violations, even if they don’t have market power? Huh? I get why he needs to try to make this move: As I intimated above, there is probably not a single firm in the world that hires low- or unskilled workers that has anything approaching monopsony power in those labor markets. Even Uber, the example he uses, has nothing like monopsony power, unless perhaps you define the market (completely improperly) as “drivers already working for Uber.” Even then Uber doesn’t have monopsony power: There can be no (or, at best, virtually no) markets in the world where an Uber driver has no other potential employment opportunities but working for Uber. Moreover, how on earth is hiring independent contractors evidence of anticompetitive behavior? ”Reclassification” is not, in fact, “standard operating procedure.” It is the case that in many industries firms (unilaterally) often decide to contract out the hiring of low- and unskilled workers over whom they do not need to exercise direct oversight to specialized firms, thus not employing those workers directly. That isn’t “reclassification” of existing workers who have no choice but to accept their employer’s terms; it’s a long-term evolution of the economy toward specialization, enabled in part by technology. And if we’re really concerned about what “employee” and “independent contractor” mean for workers and employment regulation, we should reconsider those outdated categories. Firms are faced with a binary choice: hire workers or independent contractors. Neither really fits many of today’s employment arrangements very well, but that’s the choice firms are given. That they sometimes choose “independent worker” over “employee” is hardly evidence of anticompetitive conduct meriting antitrust enforcement. The point is: The notion that any of this is evidence of monopsony power, or that the antitrust enforcement agencies don’t care about monopsony power — because, Bork! — is absurd. Even more absurd is the notion that the antitrust laws should be used to effect Steinbaum’s preferred market regulations — independent of proof of actual anticompetitive effect. I get that it’s hard to convince Congress to pass the precise laws you want all the time. But simply routing around Congress and using the antitrust statutes as a sort of meta-legislation to enact whatever happens to be Marshall Steinbaum’s preferred regulation du jour is ridiculous. Which is a point the OECD submission made (again, if only Steinbaum had read beyond the first sentence…): [T]wo difficulties with expanding the scope of antitrust analysis to include employment concerns warrant discussion. First, a full accounting of employment effects would require consideration of short-term effects, such as likely layoffs by the merged firm, but also long-term effects, which could include employment gains elsewhere in the industry or in the economy arising from efficiencies generated by the merger. Measuring these effects would [be extremely difficult.]. Second, unless a clear policy spelling out how the antitrust agency would assess the appropriate weight to give employment effects in relation to the proposed conduct or transaction’s procompetitive and anticompetitive effects could be developed, [such enforcement would be deeply problematic, and essentially arbitrary]. To be sure, the agencies don’t recognize enough that they already face the problem of reconciling multidimensional effects — e.g., short-, medium-, and long-term price effects, innovation effects, product quality effects, etc. But there is no reason to exacerbate the problem by asking them to also consider employment effects. Especially not in Steinbaum’s world in which certain employment effects are problematic even without evidence of market power or even actual anticompetitive harm, just because he says so.

#### FTC has sufficient resources now [particularly for scams]

Soto et al. 21, American attorney and Democratic politician from Kissimmee, Florida, who is the U.S. Representative for Florida's 9th district; Lina Khan is Chair at the FTC; Noah Joshua Phillips is Commissioner at the FTC; Rohit Chopra is Commissioner at the FTC; Christine S. Wilson is Commissioner at the FTC, (Darren, “Transforming the FTC: Legislation to Modernize Consumer Protection,” Committee on Energy and Commerce, 6/28/21, <https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hearing-on-transforming-the-ftc-legislation-to-modernize-consumer>)

Noah Joshua Phillips (5:06:17): Thank you, Congressman, I'd just start with the fact that when I began, our budget was about 309 million, I think, something like that, and the latest congressional budget justification has us at 389. So there's been a substantial increase in the ask, including some funding from Congress. So I think it's important to track how those resources are used. But I do think we can do more with more. That's, that's certainly a true thing. But I think it's important to take care in how we spend what we have.

Darren Soto (5:06:46): Thank you. Commissioner Chopra.

Rohit Chopra (5:06:48): Sir, I think - I know every agency says that they need more resources. But just looking at the data, we are stretched completely to capacity and the rubber band is snapping. And if we need to effectively enforce the law, we need the resources. There are so many laws that Congress has recently passed, whether it's relates to opioids or so many other topics, that the FTC has not brought a single law enforcement action on. That's not just resources. That's also Commissioner accountability. But resources will certainly help.

Darren Soto (5:07:25): Commissioner Slaughter.

Christine Williams (5:07:30): Commissioner Slaughter had to leave, but Commissioner Wilson is here. And I would say that our hard working staff have been even harder working during the last 18 months. They are teleworking but they are working incredibly hard to stay on top of the increase in mergers as well as the increase in COVID scams. And I agree with Commissioner Phillips, it's important to understand how we are spending additional appropriations. But I also know that there are many different areas of the economy where Congress has expressed interest in our being very active and aggressive. And it is difficult to do that unless we have the appropriate resources to do that.

#### Expanded enforcement drains finite resources

Dafny 21, Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and former Deputy Director for Healthcare and Antitrust in the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. Professor Dafny’s research focuses on competition in health care markets, and the intersection of industry and public policy. (Leemore, “The Covid-19 Pandemic Should Not Delay Actions to Prevent Anticompetitive Consolidation in US Health Care Markets,” *Pro Market*, <https://promarket.org/2021/06/10/covid-pandemic-consolidation-pandemic-monopoly/>)

However, as Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, the current acting FTC chair has noted, these efforts have “faced resistance, with two of these recent victories only coming after district court setbacks.” Blocking a horizontal merger, even when it appears to be an “open and shut” case to a layperson, requires extraordinary resources, including large investigation and litigation teams, as well as economic and other subject matter experts who must analyze the transaction, lay out the case for blocking the merger, and rebut arguments advanced by Defendants’ attorneys and experts. To pick a recent example, consider the proposed merger of two hospital systems in the Memphis area, which the FTC filed to block in November 2020. Based on the FTC’s complaint, the merger would have reduced the number of competing systems from four to three and created a system with over a 50 percent market share. In the face of litigation, the parties abandoned the deal—consistent with this being a straightforward case. Although the FTC prevailed without a trial, it took nearly a year from the merger announcement to the abandonment. Over that period, the FTC likely devoted thousands of staff hours to the investigation and lawsuit and expended substantial taxpayer resources on expert witnesses. The higher the payoff from the merger for the merging parties—and the payoff in the case of an increase in market power can be substantial—the greater the incentive for defendants to invest extraordinary resources to fight a merger challenge. Even if there is only a middling (and in some cases, small) chance of getting a merger through, it may well be in the parties’ interest to see if they can prevail, absorbing the agencies’ (i.e., DOJ and FTC’s) scarce resources in that attempt and preventing them from devoting those resources to investigate other transactions or anticompetitive practices. The substantial resources required to challenge transactions, paired with stagnating enforcement budgets, may explain why authorities have elected not to challenge some horizontal transactions they would likely have challenged in previous eras. Using data on a wide range of industries, antitrust scholar John Kwoka documents that enforcers rarely raise concerns about changes in market structure that used to draw scrutiny—that is, mergers that yield five or more market participants.

#### 2---outsider backlash:

#### Congressional support for FTC enforcement is high now

Edelman 6-19-2021, JD @ Yale Law School (Gilad, “The US Government Is Finally Moving at the Speed of Tech,” <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZPFV07F7X9MJ:https://www.wired.com/story/government-finally-moving-at-speed-of-tech/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>)

Now consider antitrust. Four years ago, Lina Khan was a month out of law school, where she had published a groundbreaking article arguing that the prevailing legal doctrine was allowing Amazon to get away with anticompetitive behavior. Antitrust law was not yet a high-profile issue, and Khan’s suggestion that it might apply to tech companies whose core consumer offerings were free or famously cheap was considered bizarre by much of the legal establishment. This week, Khan, at all of 32 years old, was appointed chair of the Federal Trade Commission, one of the two agencies with the most power to enforce competition law. Congress, meanwhile, has introduced a set of bills that represent the most ambitious bipartisan proposals to update antitrust law in decades, with the tech industry as their explicit target. Politics, in other words, may finally be moving at the speed of tech. In hindsight, what seems most remarkable about the Better Deal agenda is that it didn’t mention tech companies at all. Up to that point, the anti-monopoly movement in DC policy circles had been much more focused on traditional industries. Khan got her start writing about consolidation in businesses like meatpacking and Halloween candy. Silicon Valley still seemed politically untouchable. Taking on the likes of Facebook and Google, I wrote at the time, would “require angering some of the Democrats’ most important and deep-pocketed donors, something the party has not yet revealed an appetite for.” How did things change so quickly? There is no one smoking gun, but rather an accumulation of grievances that turned both Democrats and Republicans more and more against the tech companies. For Democrats, the key factor was the creeping sense that social media platforms, whatever the political leanings of their founders, had helped Donald Trump get elected. Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018 supercharged those suspicions. Investigative reports, meanwhile, kept finding evidence that far-right and racist material was spreading on social media. At the same time—and in part as a reaction to social media platforms implementing more aggressive content moderation to mollify both advertisers and liberal critics—conservatives were growing ever more concerned that liberals in Silicon Valley were discriminating against them. And Republican politicians were picking up on the political potency of that talking point. The result is that we find ourselves living in a world that looks very different from the one we were living in just a few years ago. New antitrust cases against tech giants are popping up left and right, keeping the issue firmly in the public consciousness. The companies are devoting unprecedented sums toward lobbying, advocacy, and advertising to try to avert a crackdown. And in the sharpest break with the past, Congress and the White House are taking concrete steps to restructure markets that have been left to their own devices for two and a half decades. It’s all so much, so fast, that it’s hard to keep track of the various subplots. The introduction of the five House antitrust bills and the elevation of Khan to FTC chair, for example, look like two separate stories. But they’re really two parts of the same story: Khan was herself the key investigator behind the House antitrust subcommittee’s investigation of Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google, begun in 2019. The bills introduced last week are the fruits of that investigation. (While the time between the start of the investigation and the release of legislative proposals has felt like an eternity to those of us who follow this closely, it wouldn’t be bad for a Silicon Valley product launch. It took Amazon three years to bring the Kindle to market.)

#### Any move away from consumer welfare magnifies inflation-centered political backlash

Ankush Khardori 12-14-2021, an attorney and former federal prosecutor, is a Politico Magazine contributing editor (Ankush, “It Took Forever to Get Confirmed. Now All He Has to Do is Fix All of Antitrust Law: The newly confirmed head of the DOJ’s antitrust division faces some serious obstacles in the coming year,” https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/12/14/antitrust-enforcement-obstacles-kanter-justice-department-524187

Kanter’s confirmation completes the installation of a much-vaunted trio of officials — including Lina Khan at the Federal Trade Commission and Tim Wu at the White House’s National Economic Council — who are supposed to usher in an era of antitrust reform across the federal government that has been urged by Democratic politicians, progressive think tanks and anti-corporate activists. The idea, put briefly, is to shift antitrust policy and enforcement away from the intellectual framework that has dominated the law for the last 40 years — which focuses largely on the prices that consumers pay — to a broader and more flexible approach that accounts for changes to larger market dynamics, including effects on labor and wages. This would be a daunting enough undertaking on its own, but now that Kanter is firmly at the helm of the Antitrust Division, the enthusiasm for his selection will confront several serious headwinds: organizational, legal and economic. Organizationally speaking, Kanter is coming into the DOJ without the support of a clear and built-in constituency. His selection came after the longest delay for a nominee to lead the office in modern history, and after a strange series of events that suggested the possibility that he was not the person that Attorney General Merrick Garland wanted to see in the role. That saga began with a story in late January from the American Prospect and the Intercept that reported that Garland was “hoping to install” Susan Davies, a former aide of his who had in a civil lawsuit a decade ago represented Facebook — a mortal sin among the progressive antitrust and anti-corporate set. (At his confirmation hearing the following month, Garland got visibly frustrated when asked about this, calling the report “completely incorrect,” but the American Prospect repeatedly doubled down on its reporting.) But even if Kanter’s new boss didn’t want him for the job originally, there are more significant concerns about Kanter’s ability to marshal the support and enthusiasm of the line attorneys and staff who work in the division. Kanter has never actually worked in the DOJ before and has no experience managing a large organization that resembles anything like the Antitrust Division and its 700 government employees. His government experience comprises a couple of years working at the Federal Trade Commission in the late 1990s straight out of law school. He spent the last 20 years working at a variety of private law firms in Washington, D.C., where he litigated against Google and represented companies that included Microsoft, Uber, Yelp, and News Corp. — work that is seemingly tolerated by the same people who opposed Davies on the theory that these sorts of companies have been the victims of Big Tech’s sharp-elbowed (and at times arguably illegal) business practices. As a relative outsider thrust atop a large government organization, Kanter is not that different from Khan, who now oversees more than 1,000 employees at the FTC after a very sparse government career of her own. For months, stories from POLITICO and other major outlets have reported that Khan has struggled to gain the confidence and support of the career staff who actually run the agency. It is not easy to take the helm of a large organization whose career staffers may view you with suspicion (and possibly even disdain), as Khan seems to be learning the hard way and as Kanter may soon learn as well. Legally speaking, Kanter will also need to deal with outsized expectations from progressives who may be overly optimistic about what can be achieved through more aggressive enforcement in an area of the law that is deeply conservative — ideologically, economically and jurisprudentially. A major issue will center on the department’s approach to one of antitrust law’s most fundamental concepts: the so-called consumer welfare standard — under which regulators and courts try to determine whether a proposed merger or challenged transaction will harm consumers in the form of higher prices, reduced output or diminished quality — and, more broadly, what the goals of antitrust law should be. In recent years, self-styled antitrust reformers have argued that the current framework, which is generally traced to former Solicitor General Robert Bork, is far too narrow. Khan, for instance, once argued that antitrust law should “protect consumers from anticompetitive overcharges and small producers from anticompetitive underpayments, preserve open markets, and disperse economic and political power.” In July, Biden signed an executive order on competition spearheaded by Wu that took a similarly expansive view — arguing that “excessive market concentration threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers.” Despite the generally appealing nature of this sort of language, the effort is in fact deeply controversial among many antitrust legal professionals, who question its coherence and administrability. Exactly where Kanter stands on these big questions is directionally apparent, but he has so far managed to avoid getting into some crucial specifics. In an FTC roundtable in 2018, he made clear that he was sympathetic to the reformers’ view, but during the confirmation process, he provided written responses to questions from Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) on the topic that were far shakier on particulars. In them, Kanter wrote that he had previously “voiced concerns that the application of the consumer welfare standard has been inconsistent, vague, and insufficient to keep pace with market realities” and that “effective antitrust enforcement requires a deep understanding of market realities and facts to determine whether the conduct at issue harms competition and the competitive process.” He proceeded to effectively ignore Grassley’s questions about whether antitrust law should be used either to promote wage equality or to strengthen labor rights. Kanter would not have been nominated if the administration and his backers were not confident that he shares their goals, but implementing them is another thing entirely. There are very real questions about how to administer a policymaking and enforcement regime using an amorphous combination of economic objectives and political values. What exactly does it mean to “disperse economic and political power” in the context of a hypothetical merger? When looking at a potential transaction, how do you balance the supposed effects of lower prices against wage inequality? These are not questions that will be as easy to dodge in court filings and courtrooms as they are in roundtables and law journals. Lastly, there is another challenge for Kanter and the putative reformers that they could not have foreseen years ago when they began to formulate and spread their ideas — namely, that they would come to power at an economically awkward moment. Despite the White House’s best efforts, Americans appear to be highly concerned at the moment with inflation, worried about the prices of the actual things that they buy. Depending on how long this period lasts, an antitrust enforcement program that tries to upend the consumer welfare standard and its focus on lowering costs could prove even harder than it would otherwise already be.

#### That wrecks FTC enforcement

Kovacic 20, Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, et al (William, with Allison Jones, “Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy,” *The Antitrust Bulletin*, 65.2)

D. Political Backlash

As we have already indicated, the government’s prosecution of high stakes antitrust cases often inspires defendants to lobby elected officials to rein in the enforcement agency. Targets of cases that seek to impose powerful remedies have several possible paths to encourage politicians to blunt enforcement measures. One path is to seek intervention from the President. The Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division serves at the will of the President, making DOJ policy dependent on the President’s continuing support. The White House ordinarily does not guide the Antitrust Division’s selection of cases, but there have been instances in which the President pressured the Division to alter course on behalf of a defendant, and did so successfully.125 The second path is to lobby the Congress. The FTC is called an “independent” regulatory agency, but Congress interprets independence in an idiosyncratic way.126 Legislators believe independence means insulation from the executive branch, not from the legislature. The FTC is dependent on a good relationship with Congress, which controls its budget and can react with hostility, and forcefully, when it disapproves of FTC litigation—particularly where it adversely affects the interests of members’ constituents. Controversial and contested cases may consequently be derailed or muted if political support for them wanes and politicians become more sympathetic to commercial interests. The FTC’s sometimes tempestuous relationship with Congress demonstrates that political coalitions favoring bold enforcement can be volatile, unpredictable, and evanescent.127 If the FTC does not manage its relationship with Congress carefully, its litigation opponents may mobilize legislative intervention that causes ambitious enforcement measures to the founder.

#### 3---insider backlash:

#### The plan is viewed as populist antitrust by FTC insiders---that makes effective enforcement of all FTC goals impossible

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The FTC plays an essential role in curbing illegal mergers and monopolies and increasing its enforcement is welcome. But to do so effectively, the FTC must stop ignoring the value of expertise, democratic accountability, and due process. Until relatively recently, antitrust had not been a high-profile area of law. In recent years, commentators (including at this center) made a number of critiques about the course of antitrust to push back against some of the most commonly-held antitrust assumptions. These assumptions include issues such as rulings that make class actions more difficult, insufficient merger enforcement, insufficient attention to monopsony, and the interface of IP licensing with antitrust, among other issues. Since that time, the pushback against traditional bipartisan antitrust grew. The Biden administration chose a set of antitrust critics for prominent leadership roles in the White House and at both antitrust agencies, which populists in the Republican party also embrace. A new bipartisan consensus of populists of left and right may not agree on issues such as mandatory Covid vaccines, immigration, or race but they find common cause in economic populism based on hostility to large corporations, especially large technology companies. While antitrust should always evolve as economic thinking and empirical work changes various assumptions, we believe that something different is afoot: The Biden administration is following the Trump Administration’s approach of prioritizing loyalty and ideology over expertise and experience among staff—at least at one federal agency: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). By minimizing the importance of expertise, democratic accountability, and due process, however, the FTC is undermining its ability to effectively enforce our antitrust laws. This has manifested itself in a number of ways: Fewer judicial checks on bureaucratic power. Recently, the FTC has announced that companies that want to settle antitrust concerns about a current deal must agree to give the agency the power to block later ones that it considers similar, without having to go to court. By aiming to bring cases and make rules to stop what it deems “unfair methods of competition” rather than antitrust violations, the FTC narrows the scope and defers the time of judicial review. Rejection of expertise. The current FTC leadership criticizes reliance on economic analysis, caricaturing academic literature to justify dropping the agency’s guidance to companies about which vertical mergers may be challenged. As Professors Carl Shapiro and Herbert Hovenkamp have written for this blog regarding the basis of the vertical merger guidelines: “This statement is flatly incorrect as a matter of microeconomic theory. [Elimination of Double Marginalization] applies (a) to multi-product firms, (b) regardless of whether the firms at either level have monopoly power or charge monopoly prices, and (c) regardless of whether the downstream production process involves fixed proportions. All of this has been included in economics textbooks for decades, building on a seminal 1950 paper by Joseph Spengler.” This is a symptom of the larger process problem: The majority statement on the withdrawal cited the agency’s experience—yet the staff was likely not consulted. If they had been, they could have ensured the statement made the economically-defensible case for stricter merger review. Leaders of well-managed organizations listen to staff, but the FTC staff, Commissioner Christine S. Wilson recently said, has become increasingly marginalized in decision-making, noting “current leadership has sidelined and disdained our staff.” This leads the staff to invest less in the agency and the best employees to find other employment. What keeps talented staff making less money in the government is the knowledge that they make a difference. Without motivated and high-quality staff, the FTC cannot effectively maintain current work levels, let alone effectively expand enforcement. In her testimony, Wilson said that staff have been silenced externally—or as Commissioner Wilson states more directly, FTC leadership has been “muzzling staff internally and externally”—forbidden to speak publicly and present their scholarship. Ignoring and disrespecting staff undermines the agency’s capabilities and leads to enforcement errors and court losses. Internal decision-making. Studies across fields show the importance of diverse viewpoints in creating more effective outcomes. Yet the FTC, said Wilson, has erected walls between majority Democratic and minority Republican Commissioners—they no longer share drafts of decisions, which is unprecedented in modern antitrust history. Due process. The FTC hastily created public meetings without sufficient opportunity for stakeholders to respond with comments; for example, the public had only a week to respond to the plan to drop the vertical merger guidelines to offer comments to update the reality of the merger guidelines, after roughly a year since their introduction and with arguments for its withdrawal being challenged by the leading antitrust law and economics professors and the Department of Justice expressing reservations about the hasty withdrawal. Further, the FTC invites only one-minute commentary for stakeholders and only after it has voted (often along partisan lines—a change from prior administrations where agreement on harms created more legitimacy for enforcement). The increase in political polarization has now bled into antitrust, and the FTC has become political in a way that it had not been for more than a generation. This violates accepted norms of proper notice and comment and creates a sham version of input. Further, the FTC’s abandonment of the vertical merger guidelines while the Department of Justice Antitrust Division has kept them (at least for now, though it is possible that AAG for Antitrust Kanter may withdraw) means that when a deal is reviewed by one agency, the companies arbitrarily will be treated differently than they would by the other antitrust enforcer. Undermining accountability. Populists have criticized antitrust policy as insufficiently accountable to the democratic process, making it odd the FTC is assuming authority to make competition rules without explicit Congressional authorization. Odder still, the FTC claims that Section 5 of the FTC Act should be expanded to its 1914 original intent, but at the same time expands the pre-merger review law to include the notification of debt in merger filings—against the express original intent of that law. And when companies comply with the law and then complete their mergers, the FTC is issuing letters threatening to sue at some indefinite later time, defeating the purpose of pre-merger review and eliminating a critical bargaining chip that incentivizes companies to give the FTC sufficient time to conduct its review. A Way Forward First, Commissioners should embrace procedural fairness principles of due process, transparency, and genuine openness to input. Such an embrace creates better evidence to shape outcomes. Second, the FTC should create substantive legitimacy. Deliberation on the substance requires acknowledging both the benefits and costs. The best way to do this is to seek out non-partisan expertise, as well as input from stakeholders, rather than relying on ideological predispositions in which economic analysis takes a backseat to other amorphous factors. Economic analysis provides an empirical basis for action and tools to understand evidence and data. As economics changes, it allows antitrust to embrace new theoretical insights informed by facts. Durable change requires good process, dispassionate analysis and buy-in from multiple external stakeholders as well as from the courts. Legitimacy in substantive outcomes based on careful deliberation will make such outcomes less likely to be overturned by future administrations. This greatly reduces the risk of unintended or harmful consequences. Third, use the expertise and experience of the FTC staff. If the best antitrust lawyers and economists feel disrespected and ignored, they have no reason to stay in public service for much less money than they could make in the private sector. Without them, the FTC cannot perform its essential role of keeping our economy competitive.

# 2NC

## FTC CP

### Solves---2NC

#### Funds key to solve privacy, aff can’t solve without funding.

Hoofnagle et al. 19, Chris Jay Hoofnagle: Adjunct Professor of Information and Law - University of California, Berkeley. Woodrow Hartzog: Professor of Law and Computer Science - Northeastern University. Daniel J. Solove: John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law - George Washington University Law School (“The FTC can rise to the privacy challenge, but not without help from Congress,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/>, Accessed 1-30-2022)

With greater resources, the FTC could handle many more cases. How many depends on the kinds of companies and the business areas. A horseshoe effect plagues FTC privacy enforcement: Some small companies may think themselves immune because they believe they are too inconsequential for FTC attention, while some of the largest companies have proven themselves willing to do almost anything to gain platform status.

Clearly, the number of cases the agency is doing now is not enough. On average, the FTC announces about 15-20 Section 5 enforcement settlements per year. It could start by doing on the order of 100 cases, and then study the deterrent effect among small and large companies. But it needs far more resources to scale up like this. Regardless of whether it adopts comprehensive privacy legislation that expands FTC enforcement authority, Congress should significantly expand the agency’s appropriations to enforce existing law.

#### Resources are the #1 question for fighting privacy.

Access Now 21 (“Advocates to U.S. Congress: Fund FTC to combat data abuse,” <https://www.accessnow.org/ftc-funding-combat-data-abuse/>, Accessed 1-30-2022)

Today, Access Now joined a coalition of civil society organizations to support the U.S. House Energy and Commerce committee’s proposal to increase the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) funding by $1 billion over 10 years. The funding would be used to create a new FTC bureau that will focus on policing privacy, security, and data abuse matters.

“Privacy and data protection issues have human rights and racial equity implications,” said Willmary Escoto, U.S. Policy Analyst at Access Now. “With such paltry funding and staffing, the FTC has been forced to ration its limited resources to focus on cases with the biggest impact, likely letting many violators off the hook. Increased funding will allow the Commission to hire more staff and take more cases that help reduce racial inequity.”

## Inequality CP

### Solves Heg---2NC

#### CP = Most important

Danaher ’14 (Tony; 4/24/2014; BA in Business Administration, with an emphasis in accounting, accountant with Guild Investment Management; “U.S. Hegemony, Global Flashpoints, and Military Spending,” <http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/monty-guild/u-s-hegemony-global-flashpoints-military-spending>; Date Accessed: 7/4/2017; DS)

In February, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel delivered the Obama administration’s proposed 2015 defense budget. It was notable for the reduction of the U.S. Army to **its lowest force level** since World War II. It envisions “a military capable of defeating any adversary, but too small for **protracted foreign occupations**.” (Forces could be reduced still further if the sequester makes another appearance in 2016.) Critics said that it would create a U.S. military **incapable of engaging** in two wars simultaneously, scuppering a longstanding piece of military doctrine. Mr. Hagel described armed forces that were “agile, capable, and modern,” and the proposed budget protects spending (for example) on special forces and cyberwarfare. The ideal of a more austere, agile, and effective U.S. military is **attractive**. And given the experience of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most voters hope that there are no more “protracted foreign occupations” on the horizon. Of course it would be a happier world if we only needed a military capable of defending the homeland from invasion. However, there are geopolitical realities that make the world something other than we wish. Those realities have been coming ever more to the fore during President Obama’s second term. Keeping the Global Peace and Creating Global Economic Success Today, wherever we look, we see countries where internal warfare and conflict create a lack of security and thus industry and commerce are crippled. Without entrepreneurs and workers feeling secure in their rights and possessions, they have no motivation to work and build wealth. As these countries exemplify, the critical factor in permitting the buildup of capital is the rule of law. On an international level, the situation is not so different. What’s true for a nation is also true for the international community. Economic globalization has had tremendous benefits; in the past 20 years, the global poverty rate halved (from 43 percent to 21 percent) even as population soared. Globalization was made possible by a stable international order in which countries could trade, and gained strength dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union and the birth of a world with just one dominant global power. The international order has its problems; but the Pax Americana had the effect of making the world safer than ever for trade — and the world’s people benefited from it, with billions being lifted out of poverty. Changing Course The past decade and a half has seen two dramatic shifts in the role of the U.S. within the international order, in our opinion. First, the U.S. **squandered** a great deal of its **international prestige and goodwill** in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And second, the Obama administration has retreated from the military dimension of the U.S. role as primary supporter of the global order. We are not supporting or criticizing these shifts; we are however noting that they will make the world a more challenging place for investors. Perhaps it was the American public’s exhaustion with war; perhaps President Obama believes that order can be maintained by dialogue and consensus without a “big stick” to back them up. Whatever the case, we see the **contraction of U.S. defense capability** happening just at a time when global tensions are on the rise in new and dangerous ways. Global Shift: China As we’ve commented in this letter before, China’s rise as an economic power is now complemented by China’s rise as a military power striving to be dominant in its region. During his visit to China a little over a week ago, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was met by the defiance of his Chinese counterpart. Speaking about its new territorial claims in the South and East China seas, Chang Wanquan stated: “On this issue, we will make no compromise, no concession — not even a tiny violation is allowed… We are prepared at any time to cope with any type of threats and challenges.” During the trip, Secretary Hagel was given a tour of China’s first aircraft carrier. So as the U.S. is reducing its defense posture, China is preparing to fill the vacuum in its own neighborhood. This is the path to a global order where not the U.S., but other powers — often with values very different from those of the west — make the order and set the rules. Global Shift: Syria and Iran Hopes for a self-sustaining democratic order in the Middle East were dashed after the Arab Spring led not to democracy, but to instability and civil war. Syria has been the worst example. Vladimir Putin’s Russia stepped in to protect Syria’s dictator, Bashar al Assad (and to prevent the construction of an inconvenient pipeline that might eventually connect Saudi and Qatari natural gas to Europe). Meanwhile, Iran continues to drag out negotiations with the west while it pursues its nuclear ambitions, and U.S. allies Israel and Saudi Arabia are **growing increasingly unhappy**. Even though they have not been friends, these two nations may cooperate to do something about Iran without the help of the U.S. So in the Middle East, too, new tensions and dangers are arising. Global Shift: Russia And the most recent example, of course, is Russia’s re-emergence as a threat to its neighbors in Europe. Vladimir Putin has shown in Ukraine that he is willing to use all the tricks of the trade — military confrontation, energy blackmail, and covert destabilization — to grow Russia’s sphere of influence back to its imperial glory. With the U.S. talking about reducing its ability to project force around the world, Europe’s leaders are **looking nervously** at their own defense capabilities — since the U.S. has been pulling most of the spending weight in NATO for decades. Many new NATO members (the Baltic states, for example) may be in Moscow’s crosshairs. Implications for Investors With the U.S. retreat from its role as global policeman, we see the **greater likelihood of regional instability** as other countries step in to fill the vacuum and assert their role as local powers. This means the greater likelihood of geopolitical events which cause market volatility. More conflicts, more local wars, and more destabilizing threats — these seem to be the future we’re headed towards.

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#### Global governance checks emerging tech, pandemics, and war---extinction.

Bailey 18, Professional technologist and strategic manager. Robert earned his Master of Science Degree in Computer science in 2009, and has worked since then has a product engineer developing Microsoft stack technologies. (Robert, 9-5-201, "Why do we need global governance?" *Global Governance*, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/)

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.

The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3

We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier.

There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4

Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways - we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves.

Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

### AT: Soft Power Doesn’t Link

#### Increasing US credibility and norm promotion causes retaliation by China.

Jennifer Lind 19, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House; and William C. Wohlforth, the Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, March/April 2019, “The Future of the Liberal Order Is Conservative,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/future-liberal-order-conservative

Far from ceding power to illiberal great powers, a strategy of conservatism would directly address those external threats. Part of the reason those countries contest the order is that it exacerbates their insecurities. Restraining the order’s expansionist impulses would reveal just how much of illiberal states’ current revisionism is defensive in nature and how much is driven by sheer ambition. It could also stymie potential balancing against the order by illiberal states—China, Iran, Russia, and others. Although these revisionists have many divergent geopolitical and economic interests that currently limit their cooperation, the more their rulers worry that their grip on power is under threat from a liberal order, the more they will be inclined to overcome their differences and team up to check liberal powers. Reduce that fear, and there will be more opportunities for the liberal states to divide and rule, or at least divide and deter.

#### 1AC evidence proves the link.

Michael 1AC Oppenheimer, NYU Professor, 21. Clinical Professor, Center for Global Affairs, New York University. Senior Consulting Fellow, Scenario Planning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Former Executive Vice President, The Futures Group. Member, Council on Foreign Relations. Member, The Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Member, The American Council on Germany, The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction. “The Turbulent Future of International Relations.”

Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade. Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president.7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9 But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10 Secular Stagnation This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains: …rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result. Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth… This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible. …in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development. Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12 The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates. Illiberal Globalization Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically proTrump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them. What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18 As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods: We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20 The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the preWorld War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present: Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago. …In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports. …The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable. …the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry. Multipolarity We can define multipolarity as a wide distribution of power among multiple independent states. Exact equivalence of material power is not implied. What is required is the possession by several states of the capacity to coerce others to act in ways they would otherwise not, through kinetic or other means (economic sanctions, political manipulation, denial of access to essential resources, etc.). Such a distribution of power presents inherently graver challenges to peace and stability than do unipolar or bipolar power configurations,22 though of course none are safe or permanent. In brief, the greater the number of consequential actors, the greater the challenge of coordinating actions to avoid, manage, or de-escalate conflicts. Multipolarity also entails a greater potential for sudden changes in the balance of power, as one state may defect to another coalition or opt out, and as a result, the greater the degree of uncertainty experienced by all states, and the greater the plausibility of downside assumptions about the intentions and capabilities of one’s adversaries. This psychology, always present in international politics but particularly powerful in multipolarity, heightens the potential for escalation of minor conflicts, and of states launching preventive or preemptive wars. In multipolarity, states are always on edge, entertaining worst-case scenarios about actual and potential enemies, and acting on these fears—expanding their armies, introducing new weapon systems, altering doctrine to relax constraints on the use of force—in ways that reinforce the worst fears of others. The risks inherent in multipolarity are heightened by the attendant weakening of global institutions. Even in a state-centric system, such institutions can facilitate communication and transparency, helping states to manage conflicts by reducing the potential for misperception and escalation toward war. But, as Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu argues in his chapter on the United Nations, the influence of multilateral institutions as agent and actor is clearly in decline, a result of bottom-up populist/nationalist pressures experienced in many countries, as well as the coordination problems that increase in a system of multiple great powers. As conflict resolution institutions atrophy, great powers will find themselves in “security dilemmas”23 in which verification of a rival’s intentions is unavailable, and worst-case assumptions fill the gap created by uncertainty. And the supply of conflicts will expand as a result of growing nationalism and populism, which are premised on hostility, paranoia, and isolation, with governments seeking political legitimacy through external conflict, producing a siege mentality that deliberately cuts off communication with other states. Finally, the transition from unipolarity (roughly 1989–2007) to multipolarity is unregulated and hazardous, as the existing superpower fears and resists challenges to its primacy from a rising power or powers, while the rising power entertains new ambitions as entitlements now within its reach. Such a “power transition” and its dangers were identified by Thucydides in explaining the Peloponnesian Wars,24 by Organski (the “rear-end collision”)25 during the Cold War, and recently repopularized and brought up to date by Graham Allison in predicting conflict between the US and China.26 A useful, and consequential illustration of the inherent challenge of conflict management during a power transition toward multipolarity, is the weakening of the arms control regime negotiated by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Despite the existential, global conflict between two nuclear armed superpowers embracing diametrically opposed world views and operating in economic isolation from each other, the two managed to avoid worst-case outcomes. They accomplished this in part by institutionalizing verifiable limits on testing and deployment of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Yet as diplomatically and technically challenging as these achievements were, the introduction of a third great power, China, into this twocountry calculus has proven to be a deal breaker. Unconstrained by these bilateral agreements, China has been free to build up its capability, and has taken full advantage in ramping up production and deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, thus challenging the US ability to credibly guarantee the security of its allies in Asia, and greatly increasing the costs of maintaining its Asian regional hegemony. As a result, the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty is effectively dead, and the New Start Treaty, covering strategic missiles, is due to expire next year, with no indication of any US–Russian consensus to extend it. The US has with logic indicated its interest in making these agreements trilateral; but China, with its growing power and ambition, has also logically rejected these overtures. Thus, all three great powers are entering a period of nuclear weapons competition unconstrained by the major Cold War arms control regimes. In a period of rapid advances in technology and worsening great power relations, the nuclear competition will be a defining characteristic of the next decade and beyond. This dynamic will also complicate nuclear nonproliferation efforts, as both the demand for nuclear weapons (a consequence of rising regional and global insecurity), and supply of nuclear materials and technology (a result of the weakening of the nonproliferation regime and deteriorating great power relations) will increase. Will deterrence prevent war in a world of several nuclear weapons states, (the current nuclear powers plus South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Turkey), as it helped to do during the bipolar Cold War? Some neorealist observers view nuclear weapons proliferation as stabilizing, extending the balance of terror, and the imperative of restraint, to new nuclear weapons states with much to fight over (Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example).27 Others,28 examining issues of command and control of nuclear weapons deployment and use by newly acquiring states, asymmetries in doctrines, force structures, and capabilities between rivals, the perils of variable rates in transition to weapons deployment, problems of communication between states with deep mutual grievances, the heightened risk of transfer of such weapons to non-state actors, have grave doubts about the safety of a multipolar, nuclear-armed world.29 We can at least conclude that prudence dictates heightened efforts to slow the pace of proliferation, while realism requires that we face a proliferated future with eyes wide open. The current distribution of power is not perfectly multipolar. The US still commands the world’s largest economy, and its military power is unrivaled by any state or combination of states. Its population is still growing, despite a recent decline in birth rates. It enjoys extraordinary geographic advantages over its rivals, who are distant and live in far worse neighborhoods. Its economy is less dependent on foreign markets or resources. Its political system has proven—up to now—to be resilient and adaptable. Its global alliance system greatly extends its capacity to defend itself and shape the world to its liking and is still intact, despite growing doubts about America’s reliability as a security guarantor. Based on these mostly material and historical criteria, continued American primacy would seem to be a good bet, if it chooses to use its power in this way.30 So why multipolarity? The clearest and most frequently cited evidence for a widening distribution of global power away from American unipolarity is the narrowing gap in GDP between the US and China. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts a $0.9 trillion increase in US GDP for 2019–2020, and a $1.3 trillion increase for China in the same period.31 Many who support the American primacy case argue that GDP is an imperfect measure of power, that Chinese GDP data is inflated, that its growth rates are in decline while Chinese debt is rapidly increasing, and that China does poorly on other factors that contribute to power—its low per capita GDP, its political succession challenges, its environmental crisis, its absence of any external alliance system. Yet GDP is a good place to start, as the single most useful measure and long-term predictor of power. It is from the overall economy that states extract and apply material power to leverage desired behavior from other states. It is true that robust future Chinese growth is not guaranteed, nor is its capacity to convert its wealth to power, which is a function of how well its political system works over time. But this is equally the case for the US, and considering recent political developments is not a given for either country. As an alternative to measuring inputs—economic size, political legitimacy, technological innovation, population growth—in assessing relative power and the nature of global power distribution, we should consider outputs: what are states doing with their power? The input measures are useful, possibly predictive, but are usually deployed in the course of making a foreign policy argument, sometimes on behalf of a reassertion of American primacy, sometimes on behalf of retrenchment. As such, their objectivity (despite their generous deployment of “data”) is open to question. What is undeniable, to any clear-eyed observer, is a real decline in American influence in the world, and a rise in the influence of other powers, which predates the Trump administration but has accelerated into America’s free fall over the last four years. This has produced a de facto multipolarity, whether explainable in the various measures of power—actual and latent—or not. This decline results in part from policy mistakes: a reckless squandering of material power and legitimacy in Iraq, an overabundance of caution in Syria, and now pure impulsivity. But more fundamentally, it is a product of relative decline in American capacity—political and economic—to which American leadership is adjusting haphazardly, but in the direction of retrenchment/restraint. It is highly revealing that the last two American presidents, polar opposites in intellect, temperament and values, agreed on one fundamental point: the US is overextended, and needs to retrench. The fact that neither Obama nor Trump (up to this point in his presidency) believed they had the power at their disposal to do anything else, tells us far more about the future of American power and policy—and about the emerging shape of international relations—than the power measures and comparisons made by foreign policy advocates. Observation of recent trends in US versus Russian relative influence prompts another question: do we understand the emerging characteristics of power? Rigorously measuring and comparing the wrong parameters will get us nowhere at best and mislead us into misguided policies at worst. How often have we heard, with puzzlement, that Putin punches far above his weight? Could it be that we misunderstand what constitutes “weight” in the contemporary and emerging world? Putin may be on a high wire, and bound to come crashing down; but the fact is that Russian influence, leveraging sophisticated communications/social media/influence operations, a strong military, an agile (Putin-dominated) decision process, and taking advantage of the egregious mistakes by the West, has been advancing for over a decade, shows no sign of slowing down, and has created additional opportunities for itself in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Arctic. It has done this with an economy roughly the size of Italy’s. There are few signs of a domestic political challenge to Putin. His external opponents are in disarray, and Russia’s main adversary is politically disabled from confronting the problem. He has established Russia as the Middle East power broker. He has reached into the internal politics of his Western adversaries and influenced their leadership choices. He has invaded and absorbed the territory of neighboring states. His actions have produced deep divisions within NATO. Again, simple observation suggests multipolarity in fact, and a full explanation for this power shift awaiting future historians able to look with more objectivity at twenty-first-century elements of power. When that history is written, surely it will emphasize the extraordinary polarization in American politics. Was multipolarity a case of others finding leverage in new sources of power, or the US underutilizing its own? The material measures suggest sufficient capacity for sustained American primacy, but with this latent capacity unavailable (as perceived, I believe correctly, by political leadership) by virtue of weakening institutions: two major parties in separate universes; a winnertake-all political mentality; deep polarization between the parties’ popular bases of support; divided government, with the Presidency and the Congress often in separate and antagonistic hands; diminishing trust in the permanent government, and in the knowledge it brings to important decisions, and deepening distrust between the intelligence community and policymakers; and, in Trump’s case, a chaotic policy process that lacks any strategic reference points, mis-communicates the Administration’s intentions, and has proven incapable of sustained, coherent diplomacy on behalf of any explicit and consistent set of policy goals. Rising Nationalism/Populism/Authoritarianism The evidence for these trends is clear. Freedom House, the go-to authority on the state of global democracy, just published its annual assessment for 2020, and recorded the fourteenth consecutive year of global democratic decline and advancing authoritarianism. This dramatic deterioration includes both a weakening in democratic practice within states still deemed on balance democratic, and a shift from weak democracies to authoritarianism in others. Commitment to democratic norms and practices—freedom of speech and of the press, independent judiciaries, protection of minority rights—is in decline. The decline is evident across the global system and encompasses all major powers, from India and China, to Europe, to the US. Right-wing populist parties have assumed power, or constitute a politically significant minority, in a lengthening list of democratic states, including both new (Hungary, Poland) and established (India, the US, the UK) democracies. Nationalism, frequently dismissed by liberal globalization advocates as a weak force when confronted by market democracies’ presumed inherent superiority, has experienced a resurgence in Russia, China, the Middle East, and at home. Given the breadth and depth of right-wing populism, the raw power that promotes it—mainly Russian and American—and the disarray of its liberal opponents, this factor will weigh heavily on the future. The major factors contributing to right-wing populism and its global spread is the subject of much discussion.32 The most straightforward explanation is rising inequality and diminished intergenerational mobility, particularly in developed countries whose labor-intensive manufacturing has been hit hardest by the globalization of capital combined with the immobility of labor. Jobs, wages, economic security, a reasonable hope that one’s offspring has a shot at a better life than one’s own, the erosion of social capital within economically marginalized communities, government failure to provide a decent safety net and job retraining for those battered by globalization: all have contributed to a sense of desperation and raw anger in the hollowed-out communities of formerly prosperous industrial areas. The declining life expectancy numbers33 tell a story of immiseration: drug addition, suicide, poor health care, and gun violence. The political expression of such conditions of life should not be surprising. Simple, extremist “solutions” become irresistible. Sectarian, racial, regional divides are strengthened, and exclusive identities are sharpened. Political entrepreneurs offering to blow up the system blamed for such conditions become credible. Those who are perceived as having benefited from the corrupt system—long-standing institutions of government, foreign countries and populations, immigrants, minorities getting a “free ride,” elites—become targets of recrimination and violence. The simple solutions of course, don’t work, deepening the underlying crisis, but in the process politics is poisoned. If this sounds like the US, it should, but it also describes major European countries (the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), and could be an indication of things to come for non-Western democracies like India. We have emphasized throughout this chapter the interaction of four structural forces in shaping the future, and this interaction is evident here as well. Is it merely coincidence that the period of democratic decline documented by Freedom House, coincides precisely with the global financial and economic crisis? Lower growth, increasing joblessness, wage stagnation, superimposed on longer-term widening of inequality and declining mobility, constitute a forbidding stress test for democratic systems, and many continue to fail. And if we are correct about secular stagnation, the stress will continue, and authoritarianism’s fourteen-year run will not be over for some time. The antidemocratic trend will gain additional impetus from the illiberal direction of globalization, with its growth suppressing protectionism, weaponization of global economic exchange, and weakening global economic institutions. Multipolarity also contributes, in several ways. The former hegemon and author of globalization’s liberal structure has lost its appetite, and arguably its capacity, for leadership, and indeed has become part of the problem, succumbing to and promoting the global right-wing populist surge. It is suffering an unprecedented decline in life expectancy, and recently a decline in the birth rate, signaling a degree of rot commonly associated with a collapsing Soviet Union. While American politics may once again cohere around its liberal values and interests, the time when American leadership had the self-confidence to shape the global system in its liberal image is gone. It may build coalitions of the like-minded to launch liberal projects, but there will be too much power outside these coalitions to permit liberal globalization of the sort imagined at the end of the Cold War. In multipolarity, the values around which global politics revolve will reflect the diversity of major powers, their interests, and the norms they embrace. Convergence of norms, practices, policies is out of the question. Global collective action, even in the face of global crises, will be a long shot. To expect anything else is fantasy Unbrave New World and Future Challenges At the outset of this chapter we described these structural forces as interacting to produce more conflict and diminished prosperity. We also predicted a world with shrinking collective capacity to address new challenges as they arise. What specifically will such a world look like? We address below three principal challenges to global problem solving over the next decade. Interstate Conflict In the world experienced by most readers of this volume, conflict is observed within weak states, sometimes promoted by regional competitors, by terrorist groups, or by great powers, acting through surrogates or by indirect means. Sometimes, as in Syria, this conflict spills over to contiguous states and contributes to regional instability, and challenges other regions to respond effectively, a challenge that Europe has not met. Much of this will continue, but the global significance of such local conflicts will be greatly magnified by increasing great power conflict, which will feed—rather than manage or resolve—local instabilities and will in turn be exacerbated by them. Great powers will jockey for advantage, support their local partners, escalate preemptively. Conflicts initially confined to failing states or unstable regions will be redefined by great powers as global in scope and significance. This tendency of states to view local conflicts in the context of a zero-sum, global struggle for power is familiar to students of the Cold War, but now with the additional challenges to collective action, expanded uncertainty and worst-case thinking associated with the power transition to multipolarity. We can easily observe increased conflict in US–China relations, as we will in US–Russia relations as future US administrations try to make up for ground lost during the Trump presidency, especially in the Middle East. We can observe it among powerful states with mutual historical grievances, now with a weakening presence of the hegemonic security guarantor and having to consider the renationalization of their defense: Japan-South Korea, Germany-France. We can observe it among historical rivals operating in rapidly changing security landscapes: India-China. We can observe it within the Middle East, as internal rivalries are appropriated by regional powers in a contest for regional dominance. We can observe it clearly in Syria, where the regime’s violent suppression of Arab Spring resistance led to all-out civil war, attracted outside support to proxy forces by aspiring regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, enabled the rise of ISIS, and eventually to great power intervention, principally by Russia. In a world of effective great power collaboration or American primacy, the Syrian civil war might have been settled through power sharing or partition, or if not, contained within Syria. The collapse of Yugoslavia, occurring during a period of US “unipolarity” and managed effectively, demonstrates the possibilities. Instead, with the US retrenching, Middle East rivals unconstrained by great powers, and great power competition rising, the Syria civil war was fed by outside powers, then metastasized into the region, and—in the form of refugee flows—into Europe, fundamentally altering European politics. Libya may be at the early stages of this scenario. This is not the end of the Syria story. Russia has established itself as a major player in Syria and the Middle East’s power broker, the indispensable country with leverage throughout the region. China is poised to reap the financial and power benefits of Syrian reconstruction. The US has just demonstrated, in its act of war against the Iranian regime, its willingness, without consultation, to put its allies’ security in further jeopardy, accentuating the risks of security ties with Washington and generating added opportunities for Russia and China. The purpose here is not to critique US policy, but to point out the dramatically shifting power balance in a critical region, toward multipolarity. The dangers of such a shift will become apparent as some future US president attempts to reassert US influence in the region and finds a crowded playing field. Can a multipolar distribution of power among several states whose interests, values, and political practices are divergent, all experiencing bottom-up nationalist pressures, all seeking advantages in the oversupply of regional instability, be made to work? I think not. Will this more dangerous world descend into direct military confrontation between great powers, and could such confrontation lead to use of nuclear weapons? Here the question becomes, what will this more dangerous world actually look like; what instruments of coercion will be available to states as technology change accelerates; how will states employ these instruments; how will deterrence work (if at all) among several states with large but unequal levels of destructive capacity, weak command, and control, disparate— or opaque—strategies and simmering rivalries; can conflict management work in a world of weak institutions? The collapse of the Cold War era nuclear arms control regime, the threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented by the demise of the JCPOA, and multiple indications of an accelerating nuclear arms race among the three principle powers, augurs badly. Given the structural forces at play, and without predicting the worst, we are indeed entering perilous times. Global Poverty and Inequality Despite the challenges of volatility and disruptive change inherent in globalization, the world under American liberal leadership has managed a dramatic reduction of extreme poverty. According to World Bank estimates, in 2015, 10 percent of the world’s population lived on less than $1.90 a day, down from nearly 36 percent in 1990.34 In fact, as of September 2018, half the world is now middle class or wealthier.35 The uneven success of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) exemplifies this achievement, and demonstrates what is possible when open markets are managed through strong global institutions, effective leadership and interstate collaboration. What this liberal hegemonic system did not achieve, however, was a fair distribution of the gains from globalization within states, and among those states that for various reasons were not full participants in this system. This record of partial achievement leaves us with a full agenda for the next fifteen years, but without the hegemonic leadership, strong institutions, ascendant liberalism or robust global growth that enabled previous gains. There are powerful reasons to question the sustainability of these poverty reduction gains, leading to doubts about the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals, which have replaced the MDGs as global development targets.36 (See Jens Rudbeck’s chapter and Sidhu’s UN chapter for SDGs). Skeptics have pointed to slowing global growth, specifically in China, whose demand for imported commodities was a major factor in developing country growth and job creation; growing protectionism in developed country markets, fueled by bottom-up forces of nationalism, and from top-down by a weakened global trading regime and increased geopolitical rivalry; the effects of accelerating climate change on agriculture, migration and communal conflict in poor countries; and the growth burst among poor countries from the rapid transition to more efficient use of resources, a transition that is now slowing down.37 Perhaps the greatest concern in this scenario is a general deterioration in the developing country foreign investment climate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major contributor to growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation among poor countries. It has incentivized growthfriendly policies, reduced corruption, introduced technology and effective management practices, and linked poor countries to foreign markets through global supply chains.38 It has stimulated growth of indigenous manufacturing and service companies to supply new foreign investments. It has been the major cause of economic convergence between rich and poor countries. From 2000 to 2009, developing economies’ growth rates were more than four percentage points higher than those of rich countries, pushing their share of global output from just over a third to nearly half.39 However, FDI flows into poor countries are imperiled by the structural forces discussed here. Political instability arising from slower growth and environmental stress will increase investors’ perception of higher risk, reinforcing their developed country bias. Protectionism among developed countries will threaten the global market access upon which manufacturing investment in developing countries is premised, causing firms to pare back their global supply chains. As companies retrench from direct investment in poor countries, the appeal to those countries of Chinese debt financed infrastructure projects, under the Belt-Road Initiative with little or no conditionality, but at the risk of “debt traps,” will increase. Global Warming The question posed at the beginning of this section is whether the international system, evolving toward multipolarity and rising nationalism, will find the collective political capital to confront challenges as they arise. Global warming is the mother of all challenges, and the weakness in the system’s capacity to respond is clear. With the two major political/economic powers and greenhouse gas emitters locked in deepening geopolitical conflict (and with one of them locked in climate change denial, possibly through 2024), the chances of significantly slowing global warming or even ameliorating its effects are very slim. We are reduced to the default option, nation-specific adaptation to climate change, which will impose rising human, political and economic costs on all, and will widen the gap between rich countries with adaptive capacity (of varying degrees), and the poor, who will suffer deteriorating economic, political, and social conditions. (For a contrary, optimistic view see Michael Shank’s chapter, which credits new actors—like cities—as playing a more constructive role in climate mitigation.) This would bring to a close liberal globalization’s greatest achievement; the raising of 1.1 billion people out of extreme poverty since 1990,40 with all its associated gains in quality of life (in the WHO Africa region, for example, life expectancy rose by 10.3 years between 2000 and 2016, driven mainly by improvements in child survival and expanded access to antiretrovirals for treatment of HIV).41 Several forces are at work here. The problem itself is graver—in magnitude and in rate of worsening—than predicted by climate scientists. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the major source of information on global warming, has consistently underpredicted the rate of climate deterioration. This holds true even for its “worst-case scenarios,” meaning that what was meant as a wake-up call has in fact reinforced complacency.42 (see Michael Shank’s chapter for further discussion of climate change). The IPCC, in its 2019 report, has tried to undo the damage by emphasizing the acceleration in the rate of warming and its effects, the only partially understood dynamic of climate change, and—given wide uncertainty—the possibility of unpleasant surprises yet to come. This strengthens the scientific case for urgency—to both severely limit greenhouse gas emissions, and to increase investment in ameliorating the effects. Unfortunately, the crisis comes at a moment when the climate for collective action is ice cold. Geopolitical competition incentivizes states to out produce each other, regardless of the environmental effects. Multipolarity complicates collective action. Economic stagnation mandates job creation, making regulation politically toxic. Bottom-up nationalism/populism causes states to pursue “relative gains,” meaning that if the nation is seen as gaining in a no-holds-barred economic competition with others, the negative environmental effects can be tolerated. A post-Trump presidency would help, with the US rejoining the Paris Agreement, and lending its weight to tighter regulation, increased R and D, and stronger economic incentives to reduce carbon emissions. Keep in mind, however, that President Obama was fully behind such efforts, but in a deeply polarized America was unable to implement measures needed to fulfill the Paris obligations through legislation, and his executive orders to do this were swiftly overturned by Trump. Conclusion It may be tempting to hope that post-Trump, the US can regain its global leadership and exert its considerable power in a liberal direction, but with enough self-awareness of its relative decline to share responsibility with others. This was, I believe, the broad direction of the Obama strategy, evidenced by the JCPOA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: liberal, collective solutions to global problems, as US dominance receded. This would constitute an optimistic scenario, and it confronts two major problems: can US internal politics support it (can, for example, the country legislate controls on carbon, essential for the global credibility and durability of such commitments); and is the world ready to reengage with American leadership, given the damage to its reputation and the structural forces discussed in this chapter? My educated guess is no, on both counts. The rot within is extensive, the concrete evidence clear in the economic inequality/immobility numbers, the life expectancy numbers, the deep political polarization, between the two major parties, between regions, between cities and rural areas. We are in fact a long way from fitness for global leadership, and the recognition of this by others will accelerate the decline of American influence. The rest of the world is well on its way toward adjusting to post-American hegemony, some by renationalizing their defense, or by cutting deals with adversaries, by building new alliances or by seizing new opportunities for influence in the vacuum left by American retrenchment. The evidence for this will accumulate. Observe the current and emerging Middle East, where all these post-hegemonic strategies are visible.

#### US economic weakness and Chinese economic growth are driving US retrenchment

Layne 18– Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (Chris, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” *International Affairs,* 94.1, doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 )

**LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order; italics in original**

During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States have enormous economic and geopolitical implications. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquarters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators paint a clear picture of *relative* economic decline. American primacists have advanced a number of clever but unconvincing arguments in an attempt to downplay the significance of the ongoing economic power shift from America to China. For example, some primacists assert that per capita GDP is a better yardstick of national power than aggregate GDP; that newly developed metrics of national power have diminished the importance of GDP as a measure of a state’s economic power; that China is far behind the United States in advanced technology; and that China is incapable of doing innovation.35 This last claim is ubiquitous among primacists.36 It is, however, undermined by recent developments. For example, in September 2016 China began operating the world’s largest radio telescope, which is intended to project China’s ambitions deep into the universe, and bring back the kind of dramatic discoveries that win honours such as Nobel Prizes.37 In August 2016 China launched the world’s first quantum satellite, which could lead ‘to new, completely different methods for transmitting information’.38 In another example of how China is catching up with the United States in innovation and technology, in June 2016 a Chinese computer (using made-in-China microprocessors) topped the ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers.39 In July 2017 China’s State Council announced an ambitious plan to sprint to the front of the pack in artificial intelligence (AI), including both military and civilian applications.40 Indeed, The Economist recently observed that already ‘China could be a close second to America—and perhaps even ahead of it—in some areas of AI’.41 And China is moving to the forefront in green technologies (solar panels and wind-generated power) and in electric cars.42 The waning of US economic dominance may not be obvious to primacists, but it is perfectly apparent to many observers in the real world.43 The weakening of US relative economic power, which became unmistakably clear during the Great Recession, has undercut the Pax Americana both by compromising the United States’ ability to manage the international economy and by shifting the Sino-American geopolitical balance in east Asia.

### AT: China Bad

#### Transition is peaceful---bipolarity is stable, and institutions and economics cap escalation.

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One of the contemporary issues in international relations is that the current hegemon, the United States, has undergone a relative decline. It is argued that American hegemony that emerged aftermath the Second World War is undergoing a decline and with the rise of a potential challenger in China looming, one major issue concerning IR scholars is whether or not the relative decline of US hegemony will result in a hegemonic war.

Hegemonic wars occur when a rising challenger – revisionist power – isn’t content with the current international order and wants to change it so as to become a preponderant force and dictate terms of a new world order. This article assumes that although the US is in a relative decline it is still a dominant power and the rising power is content with the current status quo so no war occurs between the dominant and the rising power. In order to support the argument that a hegemonic war does not occur, this article provides explanation using several theoretical perspectives.

Structural Realism and Balance of Power

To begin with, prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz contends that the end of the Cold War has changed the structure of international politics from bipolar to unipolar with the US being the dominant power. According to Waltz, days of US being unipolar force in world politics is numbered and slowly the world is moving towards bipolarity or multipolarity because changes in the structure of international system brings about changes in state behavior. It does not matter how much self-restraint and self-control a preponderant power is in its conduct of international relations; states are always wary and fear the dominant power and thus he maintains that balancing is universal. [1]

In order to explain why, he has resorted to the Balance of Power (theory). In most basic sense, international politics is a state of anarchy where there is no central government and states rely on themselves to protect their autonomy and perpetuate their survival. Balance of Power contends that states involve in a balancing act to check the powers of preponderant force so that no any single state has enough power to become a global hegemon. [2]

With the relative decline of US, China and America can enter into bipolar relationship much like the US and the USSR during the Cold War. Since Waltz himself posits bipolarity as the most stable of international configurations, it can be argued that act of balancing between the US and China brings the international distribution of power into an equilibrium and averts the risk of war.

Socialization of Hegemonic Power

Most scholars posit that hegemons use threats and rewards to get compliance from secondary states. Contrary to popular wisdom, scholars Ikenberry and Kupchan have contended that in addition to material power, hegemons also have the power of socialization to achieve compliance from secondary states. They call this the socialization process which involves ‘altering of the belief systems’ of elites.

Basically, hegemons project their vision of international order through normative principles (norms and values) and not by material incentives; elites in secondary states internalize them, and devise policies that are compatible to the hegemon’s ideal of the international order. The authors contend that the world order thus created can sustain even when hegemon undergoes a decline because the world order created is relatively inexpensive to maintain in the sense that altering of states preferences are by virtue of ideals rather than use of coercion. Thus, by virtue of socialization of hegemonic power, relative changes in hegemon’s distribution of material power (military and economy) does not put strain on the international system.

So, on viewing the world from the lens of socialization, it can be argued that the expansion of US normative principles on liberal economic norm to its former allies and enemies aftermath the second world war that led to the formation of the current liberal economic world order provides an explanation as to why in spite of US’ relative decline there is continuity for America’s liberal economic order. [3] The rising challenger China can be considered to have been socialized – it has accepted US led international norms, and participates in various International Organizations. Thus, it makes less sense for China to wage war against the hegemon whose ideals it has internalized.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

According to this theory, a hegemon creates a stable international economic order characterized by market openness but its decline results in global instability. This hegemonic effect of open trade benefits all participants, especially, weaker states that do not have any burden of public goods. In this sense, global economic stability is born out of hegemony and provides provision of collective public goods and in doing so facilitates a stable international system.

The motivation to create an economic openness lie in the interest of the hegemon – it has the largest economy and so benefits most from open markets. In addition, only hegemons have the material capability (political and military) to provide public goods and induce other states to embrace open trade. [4]

By virtue of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is an important element in creation and maintenance of the international system. As stated earlier, open trade benefits all participants, even the rising challengers that are accommodated in the system. In contemporary world politics, China is the fastest rising power and it is also reaping the benefits of the open economic order created by the US. By participating in the globalized economy, China has earned a comparative advantage in labor-market and its economy has been growing. On top of that China is an export-based economy and thus, it has very little incentive to jeopardize this benefit by engaging with the hegemon and thereby disrupting the order. In his article, Artur Stein has argued that decline in hegemony does not bring about a complete collapse of the trade regime as long as hegemonic power is committed to economic openness. Taking these two points in consideration, it can be argued that it is not in the interest of China to challenge US hegemony. On account, likelihood of war is averted. [5]

Robert Keohane and Institutionalist Approach

In After Hegemony, Robert Keohane uses an institutional approach to explain inter-state cooperation. He posits that states have common interest and in order to realize it requires achieving mutually beneficial agreements which is where international regimes come in. These regimes foster cooperation by making it easier to reach mutually beneficial inter-state agreements. They help overcome the problem of lack of qualitative and asymmetrical information, through institutional embeddedness reduces transaction costs, legal costs reduce incentive to cheat thereby reducing uncertainty and building confidence among states. Since hegemonic leadership is required to create regimes in the first place, even after the erosion of hegemony, they have high stakes and play important role in fostering cooperation (US role in the IMF and WTO). Because cooperation fosters absolute gain, all participants are benefitted. [6] By this approach, states see cooperation more beneficial than conflict. Thus, it can be argued from institutionalist approach that international regimes foster cooperation thereby reducing likelihood of conflict in the event of hegemonic decline.

### AT: Kim

#### Based on PTT.

Min-hyung 2AC Kim 20. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea. “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” Emerald Insight. 02-04-2019. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html>

Underlying these arguments for an inevitable war between the two superpowers is PTT. PTT originally formulated by Organski (1958) posits that **war is likely** when the power of the dominant state in the international system (i.e. hegemon) is **declining** and that a dissatisfied rising challenger **substantially reduces the power gap between the hegemon and itself**. Unlike balance of power theory, PTT argues that the war is most likely when there is near power parity between a dominant state and a rising and dissatisfied challenger (Organski and Kugler, 1980, pp. 19-20)[5]. A rising power here is generally dissatisfied with the existing international order and **initiates war against a declining hegemon in order to impose orders that are more favorable to itself** (Organski 1958, pp. 364-367). Layne (2018, p. 110) put these power transition dynamics quite succinctly as follows: “Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s).” And when the balance of power between a dominant state and a rising challenger changes sufficiently, a new order replaces an old one typically **by a hegemonic war** (2018, p. 104). Paying close attention to the **growing Sino–US competition** over hegemony in the twenty-first century, therefore, Shirk (2007, p. 4), China specialist, argues that “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.” On the other hand, scholars like Gilpin (1981) contend that the power transition war between great powers is likely to occur when a hegemonic state whose power is declining due to imperial overstretch[6] views “**preventive war as the most attractive means of eliminating the threat** posed by challengers” (Ned Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 391), although they do acknowledge that there might be some “ways to prolong the period of its power preponderance vis-à-vis the rising challenger, so that the rapidly rising power will not dare to challenge the hegemonic leadership” (Kim and Gates, 2015, p. 221). In this case, the initiator of war is a declining hegemon, rather than a rising challenger. The declining hegemon who fears a rising challenger’s overtaking its power in the near future **sees war as a better option** than other options of maintaining its hegemony such as reducing its commitments abroad and appeasing a rising challenger.

#### Applying PTT to US-China relations is inaccurate and a self-fulfilling prophecy---Multipolarity solves China war best---clinging to dominance causes arms racing and conflict.

McKinney 19, PhD from Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University (Jared Morgan, How to avoid a contest for supremacy in East Asia, Comparative Strategy, 38:4, 316-326, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2019.1633183)

A second discourse framework also emerged around the time of the pivot to Asia: the so-called Contest for Supremacy currently said to be underway in Asia between China and the United States.4 This essay contends that such a contest is based on a faulty theory of international relations and will create the very conditions in which hegemonic war is most likely. Strategists and military officers should stop thinking in terms of hegemonic competition to be number one and restore a forgotten tradition described by adjectives such as balance, parity, equilibrium, and stability.

Power transition theory and American grand strategy

The frame of a contest for supremacy, the increasingly dominant way to conceive of Sino American rivalry, is based (even if often subliminally5) on power transition theory (PTT). At the heart of this theory is the belief that there is a “dominant power” that hierarchically structures international systems, and that war becomes probable when an unsatisfied rising power approaches, or transcends, the power capability of the dominant power.6 As constituted by its authors, PTT proposed a twofold theory of peace: avoid parity or satisfy the rising power’s ambitions.7 The essential proposition of PTT—that parity comes with many dangers—has been today restated prominently by Graham Allison under the moniker “Thucydides” trap.”

Within America’s grand strategy discourse, there have been two prevailing “solutions” to the prospect of a rising China disturbing the repose of the United States, the world’s dominant state or “unipole.” The first, traditionally called “liberalism,” has been to “socialize” and integrate China into the U.S.-led system.9 The most important stage in this process was for China to gradually become democratic. The various means to achieve this end—e.g., free trade, industrialization, or the rise of a middle class—differed, but all reflected forms of “modernization” theory descended from Enlightenment thought.10 Liberalism complemented, and did not contradict, the second “solution,” which was simply to prevent power parity. This has typically gone by the name “balancing” 11 and it has been unambiguously included in America’s National Defense/ Security Strategies since at least the early 1990s.12

Both responses are increasingly seen as inadequate.13 China’s refusal to be socialized into America’s system has “defied” the expectations of liberals.14 Meanwhile, balancers increasingly warn that China is likely not just to reach parity with the U.S., but to surpass it in Asia.15 In consequence of the failure of the two “solutions” to China’s rise, fear is increasingly becoming the driving emotion behind America’s strategic disposition in the Indo-Pacific. What the U.S. fears is perfectly clear. In the words of noted Asia scholar Lowell Dittmer, “America’s Asia is becoming China’s Asia.”16

This fear is widely held.17 Insofar as a strategist accepts the theoretical assumption that the international system is hierarchical and constituted by the rise and fall of dominant/ hegemonic states,18 this fear is warranted. Historical evidence indicates that war becomes more likely in conditions of power parity,19 and a world without U.S. dominance is likely to be more illiberal in noticeable ways.20 So much for the better angels of our nature.21 Given this dilemma, America’s new consensus is that it is time for the U.S. to “get tough” and to “stand up” to China.22 That this requires unlearning the lessons of the First World War (i.e., the danger of inadvertent escalation) is simply a cost to be paid in the quest to win the contest for supremacy.23 If the choice is either to compete in Asia to maintain America’s hegemony or to cravenly leave24 for the sake of peace—surrendering it to the Chinese—only the first option realistically matches America’s (supposedly) deeply rooted attachment to the region25 and deepseated phobia of appeasement.26 Honest balancers, such as John Mearsheimer, acknowledge that staying in the region to compete for hegemony comes with a very serious risk of major-power war. Even if neither side sought intentionally to cause such a war, the “lessons” of the First World War suggest that competitive risk-taking can occasionally get out of hand, and a great war—neither quite intentional nor quite accidental—can materialize.27 What should be “almost unthinkable” in an age of nuclear weapons28 remains quite possible, for, as the annals of history demonstrate, political leaders are not consistently “prudent, enlightened, far-sighted, and peaceloving.” 29 Far from coolly calculating interests, leaders are well known to act intuitively and emotionally,30 to choose war even when it is “materially inefficient,” 31 to prefer catastrophic defeat to humiliation,32 to be obsessed with national prestige,33 and to fight for status.34 This is the “stuff” of international politics, and anyone who blindly implies the contrary has not seriously grappled either with the historical record or the ever-growing body of scholarship on the many paths to war.35

Risking major-power war may make sense if the only alternative is U.S. dominance or Chinese dominance.36 But this is a false dichotomy. In fact, PTT is fundamentally flawed both conceptually and historically. Conceptually, the theory ignores the obvious possibility that approximate parity can be a *destination* just as well as it can be a mere waypoint. Making international politics about “supremacy” is as likely to create a contest for supremacy as it is to describe one. Historically, PTT vastly overstates the evidence supposedly in its favor. Hegemonic wars do take place.37 However, such wars seem to require certain structural conditions. These include the emergence of technologies that can give certain states a large lead, the existence of powerful enabling ideologies (e.g., monotheism38 or Nazism39) and the material significance of land and mass labor in generating wealth and power.40 That being said, PTT’s most common illustrations for “hegemonic war”—the Peloponnesian War and the First World War—only support the theory in the vaguest of manners. In 431, Athens can be said to have acted from hubris and Sparta from honor;41 in 1914, Russia—not Germany—was seen as the rising and unstoppable colossus.42 In both cases, war developed out of a confluence of international structures, the actions of allies/clients, and chance. It is far from clear that the theory of “hegemonic war” actually explains anything about these cases.43

#### Retrenchment secures Chinese status aspirations---solves war.

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Accommodation and Retrenchment or Denial and Containment?

Because of the problems with the two intermediate strategic combinations, in the long-run American decisionmakers may have to choose between the two extremes: accommodate Chinese status claims while retrenching, or deny Chinese status claims while committing to maintain American dominance in East Asia, thereby containing the rise of Chinese power. In short, the choice is whether to commit to creating a Chinese partner while accepting the reduction in American influence that would likely require, or contribute – with eyes wide open – to the creation of a deeply revisionist Chinese rival while embracing the costs of confronting that reality.

The latter approach is much like the one preferred by Chapter 7’s rejectionists.22 Chinese ambitions are bound to run up against American interests, and it is no use pretending otherwise. The United States must begin to see China as a long-term strategic rival and prepare accordingly. From this perspective, there is no reason to attempt accommodation, because accommodation would require sacrifices inconsistent with either American vital interests or non-negotiable values. This would be an expensive and risky approach to managing Sino-American relations, but it at least does not suffer from the illusion that the United States can maintain its privileged position in international politics without confronting a challenge from a dissatisfied China.

The former approach is one that few policymakers and scholars openly promote.23 If the United States is interested in avoiding the creation of a deeply revisionist, anti-Western China, it needs to accommodate China’s status claims. Since these likely include the right to a sphere of influence in East Asia, accommodation would likely have to involve a reduction of the American military presence and American influence in that region. This does not mean conceding global leadership to China. Rather, the aim would be to acknowledge that China, as a great power, deserves the same rights that the United States does in world politics – including the right to manage East Asia and the South China Sea the way that the United States manages Latin America and the Caribbean.

This approach carries with it great risks and costs as well. What would be the effect on navigation and trade through the South China Sea? Would important American allies like Japan and South Korea turn into Beijing’s vassals? What if an American withdrawal from East Asia produces a regional arms race? And what if China grows more ambitious rather than more satisfied as the United States withdraws overseas?

But accommodation/retrenchment also has some important advantages. Foremost among them is that it avoids antagonizing Beijing: it is premised upon the idea that, all else equal, accommodation is preferable to denial because denial activates forces that empower hardliners. Accommodation holds out the possibility of empowering moderates and facilitating China’s integration within a reformed version of the liberal international order that has served its economic interests well. Another advantage is that accommodation/retrenchment is cheaper than any approach involving containment. Retrenchment would reduce American military expenditures while simultaneously creating incentives for other regional powers to bear a greater share of their defense burdens. The United States could return to an offshore balancing posture, which would allow it to redeploy to the region only if China tried to overthrow the new version of the status quo order by, say launching a war in East Asia. But by not signaling status denial, Washington would short circuit one of the major causes of radical revisionist challenges in history, thereby reducing the likelihood that active onshore balancing would be necessary.

### AT: Fay

#### 1---Aff internal link outweighs---they said slow growth makes hegemony impossible and we conceded it---no take backs, letting them make defense to their own internal link in the 2AC is a voter for aff conditionality and clash evasion.

#### 2---Economic decline ends pursuit and is peaceful---lack of economic growth takes away the material resources necessary to maintain hegemony AND causes leaders to calculate peaceful accession is better. They cause transition wars!! Taliaferro.

#### 3---It’s reverse causal---increased economic growth staves off US retrenchment

MacDonald and Parent 18 – Paul MacDonald is Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, Kindle Edition)

Unless trends in relative power reverse, however, our theory suggests the incoming administration will find it difficult to abandon retrenchment. Given the sluggish performance of the American economy relative to its rivals, continued deficits, and concerns about the national debt, there will be limits on the ability of the incoming administration to ramp up defense spending. Already, there have been clashes between deficit and defense hawks in Congress over the size and method of funding Trump's proposed defense increases.53 The continued increase of Chinese economic influence and military capacity in Asia presents analogous geopolitical constraints on U.S. policy in that region. Despite tough talk on the campaign trail, the real- ity is that any lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear program, mari- time disputes in the South China Sea, or the status of Taiwan will require some accommodation of Chinese interests. More broadly, efforts to remake failed states or underwrite stability in regions such as the Middle East are likely to be met with skepticism. There is little enthusiasm within either Congress or the public to undertake such ambitious projects, and it seems likely that the favored counterterrorism instruments will remain the familiar ones: standoff airpower, assistance to local allies, the selective use of special operations forces, and regional diplomacy. Given the limits on America's resources, time, and attention, the new administration will prob- ably imitate the old, seeking to keep existing wars contained, while looking to fight them on the cheap.

#### 4---Decline causes peaceful retrenchment:

#### A---Empirics and data---U.S. lash-out is extremely unlikely.

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Initial Findings

The pessimistic view of decline receives little support. A complete coding of the dependent variable for all sixteen cases of decline can be found in table 1 in chapter 1. Against arguments that retrenchment is rare, we find that declining powers retrenched in at least ten and at most thirteen of our sixteen cases, a range of 63–81 percent. On any accounting, the majority of declining powers began to retrench immediately before or shortly after their ordinal transition. We further find that great powers maintained policies of the status quo in at least two and at most five of our sixteen cases (a range of 13–31 percent). This finding suggests domestic interests can constrain retrenchment, but only in unusual circumstances. We also find that declining powers rarely take up policies of expansion. We find unambiguous evidence of expansion in only one of our sixteen cases: 1931 Germany. Aggressive responses to decline appear to be the exception, rather than the rule.

Decline and Preventive War

First and foremost, we did not find much support for preventive war logic. Declining powers experienced war in 4.5 percent of their country years, compared to 6.1 percent for non-declining powers. Of the sixteen cases, only six (38 percent) found themselves in an interstate war within five years of their ordinal transition. Two of these cases, however, concerned a declining great power clashing with a non-great power: Russia in the 1877 Russo-Turkish War, and France in the 1884 Sino-French War. Two additional cases involved a declining great power coming to blows with a rival great power, but not the one that had just overcome it in rank: Britain against China in the 1950 Korean War, and Russia versus Japan in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. None of these cases resonates with the preventive war narrative, where a declining power seeks to preserve its rank through force. 21

#### B---The aff’s uniqueness means even a hesitant US will be forced to retrench.

MacDonald & Parent 18, Paul MacDonald: PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph Parent: PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, *Cornell University Press*)

Two causal mechanisms work to push even the most hesitant of declining powers toward a strategy of retrenchment. The first is negative feedback: any state acting on an idealistic conception of what its power and goals are will soon rub up against reality. 7 Declining powers that hold fast to the status quo set themselves up for failure. In foreign policy, sagging capabilities and a sprawling defensive perimeter will court disaster. Predatory powers will probe overextended and vulnerable commitments. Tough talk will be exposed as empty boasts. Unintended crises or unnecessary conflicts will sap resources from already bare coffers. Meanwhile at home, efforts to extract resources from a diminished base will come at considerable cost. Citizens will bristle at higher revenue demands and resent the disproportionate burdens of government exactions. All the while, more pressing domestic reforms will receive limited attention and insufficient funds. The single biggest incentive to retrench is to avoid the repeated and unexpected policy failures that accompany decline.

#### 6---Decline solves transition conflict---only clinging causes war.

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In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced.

Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state’s rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times.

Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

### AT: Brands

#### Extensive alliance commitments create a moral hazard for escalation---exerting discipline is key.

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Exert Alliance Discipline

Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Trump has materially increased American alliance commitments. U.S. troop deployments and investment in NATO have risen, troop deployments to the Middle East and arms sales to Gulf States have risen, and the frequency of FONOPS in Asia has risen. If the United States maintains its alliances and refuses to revise that choice, then it must rediscover what its alliances are for. They are not “ends” in themselves, but means to an end, namely protecting American security interests. To make alliances serve that purpose, however, Washington should exert some discipline on its allies. This is so especially in the Middle East, where U.S. clients too often act in ways that infringe on U.S. security interests. Only recently, it was revealed that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates transferred U.S.-supplied weapons to Sunni jihadi groups with Al Qaeda links in Yemen, adding to a long record of Saudi sponsorship of anti-Semitism in schools and jihadist preaching, as well as passive support for Islamist causes and organizations. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence’s ties with the Taliban and the Haqqani network are well known, admittedly a difficulty Washington has been wrestling with for decades. Cultivated as a bulwark of stability in Central Asia, Kazakstan has embarrassed Washington with its human rights violations while pursuing defense cooperation with Moscow.

To make alliances work for its interests, the United States should restore what used to be part of its repertoire as a great power —the imposition of conditions on its protection, and the credible threat of abandonment. In other words, contrary to the standard orthodoxy often invoked by Trump’s critics, a critical ingredient in an effective patron-client relationship is the cultivation of a reputation for limited reliability, if not unreliability. Thus, the United States should make clear that it is willing to walk away and that its alliance commitments are conditional on its ally’s prudent behavior. In a world of worsening rivalries, the U.S. ability to control escalation and limit inadvertent spirals depends partly on its capacity to restrain third parties and keep its initiative. To make this threat credible, it may require the United States occasionally to terminate an alliance relationship.

There are fine lines to be walked here. The United States has alliances for the most basic purpose of augmenting its power, its reach and the totality of its presence. From this perspective, it is in Washington’s interests to have militarily proficient friends. But its alliances have other rationales that cut against that simple desire. Another central historical purpose of American alliances in the postwar period is to contain its allies. By providing security, Washington in theory removes incentives for its allies to rearm and reassert themselves as challengers. This imperative, to depress allies’ defense expenditure, requires in turn that Washington must establish a reputation for being a reliable security provider. Failure to maintain that baseline of confidence could lead the client to pursue belligerent self-help, or even other allies in lieu of the United States. Yet, establishing a reputation for reliable security provision can and does have a perverse result—it creates a moral hazard. Allies’ confidence in American backing can embolden them to behave recklessly in ways that Washington dislikes. Conversely, the dependency Washington forms on the alliance, as an indispensable platform for its power projection, creates reverse leverage, making Washington reluctant to attempt to impose itself with threats of abandonment or even public criticism.33

Some allied states have tested the possibilities of this relationship with a spirit of adventure, tolerating or encouraging militant Islamist activity, suppressing peaceful protests, committing human rights violations, locking up citizens of allied countries in humiliating and brazen fashion, and threatening or carrying out military campaigns against Washington’s wishes with strategically corrosive results, such as the present onslaught in Yemen. Even the most outspoken supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance will admit that U.S. guarantees have not restrained Tel Aviv from settlement expansion. As Asia becomes more competitive, a rearming Japan could also start to test alliance boundaries, either because of lost faith in American security guarantees or because it takes them for granted. In Eastern Europe, the cast-iron guarantee built into NATO could lead states to miscalculate and behave recklessly against Russian minorities in their own territory, quickly fomenting a cross-border crisis.

There is a difficult balancing act to be struck here, if the United States chooses to maintain allies to increase its material strength while containing those same allies. The threat of abandonment, or withdrawal of patronage, was once a greater part of U.S. diplomatic repertoire behind the scenes.34 The United States explicitly threatened West Germany, South Korea and Taiwan in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, for instance. It seems to have receded to an extent, after the Cold War, when the sense weakened of the need to keep allies in line coercively. Trump’s public humiliation of and threats to allies, usually followed swiftly by increased U.S. commitment, are probably too hollow and less effective in the long run than the quiet threats made by past administrations.

Certainly, the United States has an interest in preventing allies being complacent about American guarantees, or worse, of the United States being so anxious about losing access and influence that it dare not exercise it. One of the superpower’s greatest advantages is its ability to leave. This is a possibility it should deftly exploit. Against traditional orthodoxies about “global leadership,” the overall U.S. position would benefit from the possibility that Washington might not have an ally’s “back” if it behaves recklessly against the superpower’s stated preferences, or if it hedges too much in favor of rivals. In other words, U.S. alliances are likely to serve U.S. interests better if it ceases fetishizing them.

#### Heg is provocative and motivates prolif to deter US intervention.

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Bases can also motivate nearby adversaries to pursue nuclear weapons. Iran’s expansion of nuclear enrichment in the run‐​up to the recent nuclear deal between Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany, for example, was likely understood by many in Tehran as a measure of protection from the United States. After all, the United States habitually intervenes in the region, is allied with Iran’s two most vociferous enemies (Israel and Saudi Arabia), and has carried out regime change and years of military occupation in the countries on Iran’s immediate east and west flanks. In addition, while bases in Japan and South Korea have arguably helped dissuade these countries from developing nuclear weapons, the U.S. presence creates pressure for North Korea to do so. Pyongyang’s efforts to secure a deliverable nuclear weapon may be partly motivated by a desire for the prestige associated with such capabilities, but fear of U.S. military power in South Korea, and a desire to deter an attack by either or both countries, are also significant motivators. Proximate U.S. military forces and an adversarial relationship with Washington helped motivate China’s 1964 acquisition of nuclear weapons. 73 And, in recent years, U.S. actions in Iraq and Libya have signaled to potential rogue states the wisdom, rather than the danger, of obtaining a nuclear deterrent, or at least maintaining a threshold breakout capability. 74

#### Assurances don’t solve prolif AND cause hedging.

Korda 18, Research Associate, for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (Matt, “The only choice is both choices: balancing assurance and coercion in nonproliferation focused alliance-management strategies,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 25.3, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2018.1518758)

Quantitative analyses may not be adequate to assess the utility of assurances for nonproliferation purposes. As the following case studies show, the mere existence of a defense pact often does not constitute a sufficient assurance measure to deter allied proliferation, and is therefore unsuitable as a proxy variable. Assurance and coercion strategies come in many different flavors, and therefore qualitative analysis is more appropriate in order to assess their relative utility. To that end, this article argues that neither assurance-centric nor coercion-centric strategies hold up under historical scrutiny. By uniquely considering how assurance and coercion work in tandem, this article concludes that both are necessary in order to prevent allied proliferation. Targeting only one strand of the security model is not enough to prevent allied pursuit of nuclear weapons. A strategy that overemphasizes assurance or coercion will likely encourage the targeted state to pursue a hedging strategy, in which the client continues to clandestinely develop latent nuclear capabilities while continuing to benefit from its patron’s security guarantee. Instead, by applying a combination of assurance and coercion, the patron can shape a “path of least resistance” for its client’s continued security that does not involve allied nuclear proliferation.

#### Primacy makes credibility unsustainable---pulling back strengthens it.

Krebs & Spindel 19, \*Ronald R. Krebs is a professor in the liberal arts and professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, \*\*Jennifer Spindel is an assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma and a fellow at the Dickey Center at Dartmouth. (10-30-2019, “Trump’s mismanagement of the withdrawal from Syria hurt alliances — not the withdrawal itself”, *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/30/trumps-mismanagement-withdrawal-syria-hurt-alliances-not-withdrawal-itself/)

Those who chase credibility end up with none Allies live in constant fear of abandonment. Smaller allies often worry that when push comes to shove, their great-power patron may not come to their aid. They understand that allies share some, but not all, interests and that the alliance “halo” is often quite limited. With good reason, the Kurds care less for Trump’s fulsome tweets than for his deeds. How can nervous allies be reassured? During the Cold War, scholars and policymakers argued that the United States could bolster its credibility with adversaries and allies by consistently embracing hard-line policies and displaying strength. Limited military interventions, especially in far-off locales in defense of secondary priorities, would be particularly effective in reassuring nervous allies. If a major power was willing to expend significant resources in places of trivial value, it would surely honor its commitments to allies in locations of far greater strategic interest. This logic led, among others, to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet War in Afghanistan — now generally seen as tragedies for all involved. Such arguments did not die with the end of the Cold War. President Barack Obama was pilloried by critics across the political spectrum in 2013 when he shied away from launching a bombing raid in response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons. They subsequently accused him of thereby emboldening the Russians — contributing in early 2014 to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its covert intervention in Ukraine and in fall 2015 to its overt intervention in Syria. His about-face, they contended, had frightened traditional regional allies, notably the Israelis and Saudis, who began to consider other patrons and arms suppliers. Trump’s sudden announcement, for the second time, that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Syria has reportedly worried U.S. allies even beyond the Middle East. Yet this logic is a recipe for never-ending interventions and ever-expanding commitments, which will eventually undermine alliance credibility. If states can never walk back existing commitments, they will be stretched so thin that others must doubt their will and capacity to fulfill their core alliance commitments. Credibility is a greedy master that no state can unthinkingly serve. Those who chase credibility as a means to national security — by embracing uncompromising policies, steadfastly upholding all commitments, and refusing to retrench — find themselves without either credibility or security. Pulling back need not undermine alliances. The Vietnam War was precisely the kind of high-cost intervention that should have powerfully signaled U.S. resolve and reassured its allies around the world. In fact, we find, the war made America’s allies outside the region more nervous than ever that the United States might renege on its commitments. When the United States finally pulled out of Vietnam, withdrawing with little honor, its allies cheered. Our research suggests that, if handled properly, withdrawals from existing commitments can hearten allies. However, this requires publicly drawing clear distinctions between core and peripheral interests, employing a considered policy review process, and working to minimize negative policy externalities—none of which Trump did in suddenly announcing, via tweet, on Oct. 7 that “it is time for us to get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars, many of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home …” The muddle of public statements from U.S. officials that followed over the next two weeks only compounded the issue.

#### The US can either ignore Russian status ambitions or accommodate them. Failure to accommodate provokes Russian destabilization and conflict.

Krickovic 18 – PhD in Political Science @ UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of World Economy and International Affairs @ HSE (Andrej, “Russia’s Challenge: A Declining Power’s Quest for Status,” *PONARS Eurasia*, 543)

One seemingly rational policy might be to ignore Russia for the time being and to postpone the day of reckoning to the future, when Russia will be weaker. This was the approach largely followed by the Obama administration. However, it provokes Russia into engaging in even more reckless and destabilizing behavior in order for it to have its voice heard—as Obama soon found out in Ukraine and Syria. Containment, the policy now favored by many Russia hawks in Washington, risks dangerous confrontation with a country that, despite its weaknesses, is still a nuclear superpower with a formidable military. What’s more, containment is unnecessary. Russia’s leaders are well aware of the limits of their country’s power and are not looking to overtake the United States as the global hegemon or to take over management of the international system. Accommodating Russia’s status aspirations will not embolden it to pursue more radical revisionism. Instead of ignoring or containing Russia, Western leaders must try to find ways to channel its status-seeking behavior in constructive ways that contribute to global peace, stability, and development. Russia’s efforts toward economic reintegration of the post-Soviet space may have been such an opportunity. From the very start, Russian leaders made it clear that these efforts were not aimed at creating a closed neo-Soviet trade block, but were designed to strengthen Russia’s position in the larger process of pan-European integration with the EU. Eurasian economic integration could have contributed to the economic development and stability of a problematic and dangerous region while also allowing Russia to improve its international status through peaceful and constructive means. Instead of engaging with Russia’s regional integration efforts, the United States and the EU pushed back against them, threatening Moscow with further status losses and provoking (what should have been) a predictable backlash. Other opportunities to engage Russia’s status seeking in a constructive way will present themselves in Syria, Ukraine, and in the geopolitical realignments that China’s rise will generate. They will confront Western policy makers with difficult choices that will force them to find a balance between their beliefs and values and the harsh realities of power politics. In making these choices, they must understand just how important status concerns are for Russia and realize that the bigger dangers come not from empowering a declining Russia through accommodation, but from ignoring its status aspirations or seeking to constrain them.

#### Attempting to maintain hegemony over Russia backfires and triggers nuclear cyber-war.

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The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels, proxy battles, information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently?

But wars do not always begin by design. Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing geopolitical ambitions, distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that neither side wants nor expects.

In fact, cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber world into the physical domain is a serious danger.

Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will fire when buttons are pushed. This makes containing a crisis that might arise between U.S. and Russian forces over Ukraine, Iran or anything else much more difficult. It is not hard to imagine a crisis scenario in which Russia cyber operators gain access to a satellite system that controls both U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons systems, leaving the American side uncertain about whether the intrusion is meant to gather information about U.S. war preparations or to [preclude] ~~disable~~ our ability to conduct nuclear strikes. This could cause the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces an urgent “use it or lose it” nuclear launch decision. It doesn’t help that the lines of communication between the United States and Russia necessary for managing such situations are all but severed.

A related, second assumption American policymakers make is seeing the Russian threat as primarily a deterrence problem. The logic goes something like this: Wars often happen because the states that start them believe they can win, but the United States can disabuse a would-be aggressor of this belief through a show of force, thus deterring conflict. Indeed, Washington seems convinced that showing the Kremlin it will punish Russian transgressions—through toughened economic sanctions, an enhanced military posture in Europe and more aggressive cyber operations—is the best path to preserving peace.

But, when dealing with states that believe they are under some form of assault, focusing on deterrence can be counterproductive. Rather than averting aggression by demonstrating the will to fight back, America might be unintentionally increasing the odds of a war. To a great degree, this is the situation the United States already faces. Years of enlargement of NATO and perceived U.S. involvement in Russia’s internal affairs have convinced the Kremlin that America poses an existential threat. In turn, Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, coupled with a string of aggressions against its neighbors, have convinced Washington that Moscow is going for the West’s jugular.

The United States experienced this spiral phenomenon with Georgia in 2008. Convinced that Russia harbored aggressive designs on its southern neighbor, Washington policymakers accelerated U.S. military training in Georgia, openly advocated bringing Tbilisi into the NATO alliance and issued multiple warnings to Moscow against military action, believing this firm resolve would deter Russian aggression. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Russia grew increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Georgian membership in NATO, while Tbilisi felt emboldened to launch a military operation in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, which yielded an immediate and massive Russian military response

#### Deterrence by domination fails---interest asymmetry and blowback aggression.

Green 20, Assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati (Brendan, “Security Threats in Contemporary World Politics: Potential Hegemons, Partnerships, and Primacy,” Chapter in A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, *CATO Institute*, published online May 6th, 2020 at: <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/security-threats-contemporary-world-politics-potential-hegemons>, Accessed 12-23-2021)

Primacy’s core difficulty is that if highly motivated revisionist states exist, they will be incredibly difficult to manage even with the presence of the American pacifier. Such states are least likely to credit American threats and promises, and they are most likely to accept the costs of American punishment. Primacy has a Goldilocks problem: conditions can be neither too hot nor too cold. Challengers to the American order must be so strongly motivated that they are willing to pay the very considerable costs associated with modern conflict, but not so strongly motivated that the prospect of fighting the United States fails to deter them. Perhaps that describes the world in which we live, but it seems far more likely that only a few states are motivated by an amount of revisionism that is “just right.”

Primacy depends on allies and adversaries alike being responsive to American security guarantees. The more states prefer other objectives to security, the less likely American security blandishments are to influence their behavior. Revisionist opponents will have good reason to believe they have a stronger will than the United States on critical non‐​security issues, and challenges are likely. The simple fact that such states will care far more about the issue in dispute will, thus, incentivize a gamble that the United States will decline to intervene. Even if the United States chooses to fight and even if the United States can deny the challenger its military objectives, revisionists motivated by non‐​security aims will have good reason to believe they can win the resulting contest in pain. How long will Washington continue to bear costs over a quarrel in a faraway country between people about whom it knows nothing?

If the revisionists are allies of the United States, they may simply value the issue at hand more than they value security guarantees. Alternatively, they could make the opposite bet, gambling that the United States can be convinced to support their objectives, however grudgingly, or that less resolved regional actors will be deterred by that possibility. In any case, a basic point holds. Revisionists must take risks to obtain their objectives. A state that places a very high value on non‐​security gains is much more likely to take risks. It is difficult to imagine the Goldilocks revisionists for whom U.S. commitments represent the decisive factor in their calculus.

Those dangers are particularly evident when states seek positional goods, such as status or prestige, that tend to be zero‐​sum. For instance, Wohlforth argues that status is connected to material capabilities and that “dissatisfaction [with status] arises not from dominance itself, but from dominance that appears to rest on ambiguous foundations.”28 Multipolar environments, he argues, cause status dissatisfaction because there are multiple indexes of capability (e.g., military, naval, economic) across which states compare themselves, all of which provide different assessments of status. An illustrative example is the Crimean War, where Russia pursued status goals against an overwhelming coalition whose members themselves had no security concerns. Wohlforth argues that Russia’s power on land and its ambiguity about Britain’s economic power led Russia to pursue a higher rank than it could secure with its capabilities.

Applying those arguments to East Asia should give us pause. Though Wohlforth argues that unipolarity should produce an unambiguous status hierarchy, East Asia looks similar to the Crimean example. Using Wohlforth’s metrics, China has the largest ground force in the world and the ability to rapidly augment it. That point of comparison could be relevant for potential flash points such as the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese navy is no match for its American counterpart in the open ocean, but it is growing and modernizing and would likely be operating close to its own coasts in a potential clash. Economic measures throw the problem into bold relief. Using an index of energy consumption and iron and steel production, Britain was 13.5 times more powerful than Russia at the time of the Crimean War. China’s GDP is roughly half of America’s now and is projected to overtake Washington in the next couple of decades.29 Tsarist Russia had not undergone the Industrial Revolution and misunderstood its economic implications. By contrast, Chinese growth is well understood and is the most salient feature of contemporary East Asian politics. There seems ample cause for the Chinese to experience status dissatisfaction across a number of metrics, which could be very difficult to manage through American commitments in the region.

Offensive realist revisionists pose a similar problem. Offensive realism predicts a bleak world of relentless security competition because of its focus on uncertainty. States cannot reliably predict one another’s intentions—a very difficult task in the present, and an impossible one any distance into the future. “In a world where great powers have the capability to attack one another and might have the motive to do so,” John Mearsheimer argues, states “must at least be suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them.” The result is that “each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival.” The only reliable provision for security is more power.30 Unfortunately, that conclusion means that “alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy,” and vice versa. Offensive realist predictions are, therefore, trouble for primacy. Friends and foes will be looking to take advantage of one another, and they will not be prone to regarding the commitments the United States made a long time ago as especially relevant to the present. Indeed, “great powers are also sometimes unsure about the resolve of opposing states as well as allies.” That uncertainty leads to calculated risks by aggressors and allies who begin to take security measures as though the United States may not intervene. Furthermore, because “fighting wars is a complicated business in which it is often difficult to predict outcomes,” revisionists of all stripes have incentives toward innovation and clever strategies. Fait accompli tactics that quickly revise the status quo and then dare others to push for reversal, or new military technology and doctrines that give revisionists hopes of a quick victory, are likely to be common in an offensive realist world. American commitments will be of questionable value for deterrence or reassurance under those circumstances.31

Nuno Monteiro has recently laid out the problematic relationship between offensive realist assumptions and American strategy. He argues that primacy—which he calls a strategy of “defensive dominance”— tends to create extremely dedicated minor power revisionists, for two reasons. First, primacy is a strategy of locking in the status quo through formal or informal commitments to regional actors. A favorable status quo for major regional powers will often come at the expense of local minor powers, which may be inclined to try to reverse it: for both security reasons and the non‐​security reasons noted earlier, a unipolar world will reduce the “value of peace” for some countries.

Second, the most prominent aspects of the status quo being locked in are the extant territorial, alignment, and power distribution conditions. Those conditions pose no special problems for a state that can ensure its own survival, but minor powers by definition cannot. They exist in a state of radical uncertainty regarding the intentions of the unipole. Lacking the hope of an external sponsor should the unipole turn on them, recalcitrant minor powers have incentives to build up their military power, pursue nuclear weapons, and change the status quo through salami tactics. Those actions are just the sort of security competition that primacy hopes to prevent, and they are likely to precipitate a clash with the unipole.32

#### BUT commitment traps mean we still get drawn in.

Green 20, Assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati (Brendan, “Security Threats in Contemporary World Politics: Potential Hegemons, Partnerships, and Primacy,” Chapter in A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, *CATO Institute*, published online May 6th, 2020 at: <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/security-threats-contemporary-world-politics-potential-hegemons>, Accessed 12-23-2021)

Primacy depends heavily on credibility: the belief among interested actors that, in the final reckoning, the United States will go to war to protect the status quo it has promised to defend. A related important belief is that the United States will go to war only to protect the status quo it has promised to defend. A primacy strategy engages in a combination of “extended” and “pivotal” deterrence: it aims to convince revisionists of all stripes of American willingness to punish those who seek to overturn the status quo.

As discussed earlier, the world with revisionist states motivated enough to make primacy useful will also be one where American credibility is open to question. Offensive realist states will be motivated by a view of uncertainty that sees alliances as often unreliable alternatives to self‐​help. States with non‐​security motives will have good reason to believe that they hold the balance of resolve on non‐​security issues far from American shores. In either case, there will be ample reason for risk‐​acceptant revisionist states to consider gambling against American intervention.

To be clear, revisionists would not be doubting U.S. capabilities, although clever diplomatic and military strategies might lead them to believe they could temporarily revise the status quo. Rather, revisionists would doubt that America’s interests were large enough to justify the costs of war. Daryl Press, who generally emphasizes the decisive influence of power considerations in deterrence decisions, argues that “adversaries will doubt whether the United States will take costly actions to defend interests of secondary or tertiary importance.” A good historical example is the German military’s view of the Anschluss. Even though senior Wehrmacht officers believed that Britain and France could intervene and defeat Germany during an invasion of Austria, they endorsed Hitler’s plans, largely because they doubted that the Western powers would risk war over the unification of German speaking peoples in one country.37

In the event that deterrence fails, what will Washington do when faced with a challenge to the status quo? There is good reason to believe that policymakers will follow through on their commitments, even though the costs of war may be quite disproportionate to American stakes in the issue under dispute. After all, wouldn’t a failure to defend the status quo reveal the entire primacy strategy to be a bluff? Revisionist states might be expected to draw that conclusion, no matter how the United States framed the situation. One does not need to believe that states carefully monitor each other’s past actions in order to draw inferences about likely future behavior to credit that notion. Backing down over a commitment might clarify for many interested parties American interests in defending other commitments—all far from U.S. shores and protecting interests far more important to others than to Washington— that look just like it.

Regardless of whether revisionist states make such inferences, it is crystal clear that American decisionmakers believe they do. Harry Truman’s decision to intervene in Korea was driven by the belief that the Soviet Union would draw inferences about American willingness to fight. “If we let Korea down,” Truman argued, “the Soviet will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.” Conversely, “if we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps.”38 The American commitment in Vietnam hinged on credibility concerns as well, especially with regard to what its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would think. Lyndon Johnson believed that escalation was required because “to leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people [i.e., other U.S. allies] in the value of an American commitment.” Richard Nixon believed he had to stay in Vietnam because “the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations’ confidence in our reliability.” And John Kennedy was willing to risk nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis because “for us to fail to respond would throw into question our willingness to respond over Berlin.”39

Beyond credibility concerns, U.S. leaders may be drawn into conflict by an expanding notion of U.S. interests. Allies can take on a value independent of their geopolitical position, thereby leading the United States to protect their survival. Unfortunately, once Washington is committed to treating the security of other states as a core value, those states gain leverage over American policy. A local revisionist can credibly threaten to bear costs and risks on issues it cares deeply about, even if the United States abandons it. If the United States does not believe it can abandon its allies, it will be left adjusting its own policy to absorb the costs and risks of allied revisionism. The Cold War provides abundant examples of that danger. Because the American project in Europe was so dependent on France, the United States ended up taking on most of the costs of France’s colonial war in Indochina. Once Indochina fell, the United States began to value South Vietnam as a bulwark of anti‐​communism in the region. That attitude led to increasing support of the regime in Saigon, even though it thwarted American efforts aimed at internal reform that might have strengthened its hold on power.40

### AT: China Revisionist

#### Reject either/or revisionism---only status can explain contradictions.

Simon 17, PhD Candidate @ Lingnan University (ABERG John Hugo, Status, revisionism, and great power strategy: US-China positional competition and the struggle for leadership in Asia-Pacific, *Digital Commons at Lingnan University*, Available Online at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=pol\_etd)

Starting with China, previous studies claim that China is either a status quo power13 or a revisionist power,14 and proponents of the different standpoints have their daggers drawn about whose account is the most accurate one.15 Yet we need to escape the trap of the either/or logic and open up to the possibility that China simultaneously can be a status quo power and a revisionist power. This becomes obvious when we consult primary official Chinese sources as well as secondary academic exegesis of Chinese foreign policy. As Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress Fu Ying makes clear, China has indeed “chosen to integrate itself into the international order,” yet at the same time, it seeks to “improve…its representation.”16 Similarly, Yong Deng, in his groundbreaking study on China’s struggle for status, accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to engineer China’s great power emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they have geared their diplomacy toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate China’s great-power ascent.” 17 Here we notice a tension between integrating and accepting the rules of the game and changing the status order, as evidenced by China’s admission to the WTO and its acceptance of global trade rules, while simultaneously struggling to gain a greater position within the WTO hierarchy. 18

If we turn to the United States, we can observe a comparable puzzle. For sure, logically the United States cannot be a revisionist power in relation to the positional status dimension of the international order. If it desires to maintain its preeminent position, this unequivocally means preservation of the status-quo. Yet whereas Barack Obama stresses the desire to maintain global leadership, he at the same time emphasizes the need to write new regional rules to ensure leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

19 In their respective studies on the Bush administration’s “transformational diplomacy,” Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd highlight that the United States, in that it wants to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously “seeks to change the rules of that order.”20 In this way, the United States is taking active part in a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the international system.”21 I hash out this problem at length in the conceptual section of the literature view.

Status quo and revisionism are best conceptualized in relation to a struggle between “alternative international orders,” 22 which makes the definition of international order fundamental to the scientific enterprise of investigating preservation and change in the international system. What is at stake, however, does not fit a unidimensional conceptual framework. On the one hand, we are grappling with a social-relational, positional dimension of the international order that concerns status; on the other hand, we are dealing with a social-systemic dimension of the international order that concerns institutions. Yet apart from a conceptual framework that takes into account both the positional and the institutional dimensions of the international order, we must also demonstrate how they relate to the two core domains of the international order – the economic domain and the security domain. My conceptual framework addresses this problem and makes a significant contribution to the definitional parameters of international order, necessary to improve our understanding of status quo-seeking and revisionism and the ongoing struggle between alternative regional orders in the Asia-Pacific.

The second scientific component of the dissertation concerns theoretical innovation. Even though the underpinnings of my theoretical framework to a large extent build on structural realist insights, there are certain theoretical problems that call for theoretical remodeling in order to enable the analysis of status quo-seeking and revisionism to pierce both ways – towards explaining the policies of preservation and change of both the rising great power and the declining superpower.

Various structural realist theories essentially view the dominant state as “always satisfied” and the rising power as dissatisfied and revisionist by definition.23 The theories can therefore not fathom that the US is a deeply conservative power in that it wants to maintain its preeminence atop the global hierarchy, yet at the same time, in both its neoconservative and liberal internationalist guises, a deeply revisionist power that wants to rewrite the rules of the game.24 The theories can neither conceive of China as simultaneously being dissatisfied with the international status order dominated by the United States while being satisfied, in part, with the institutional foundation of the international order, which serves its interests, incurs great benefits, and largely underpins its rise. Yet despite their shortcomings, the major structural realist theories all elucidate that the dominant power will take preventive measures to block the ascendance of the rising state.25 As Mearsheimer states: “the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia.”26 These preventive measures to maintain dominant status are revisionist.

In essence, we need to shift the theoretical focus from security to status. The explanatory focus of structural realist theories relates status quo-seeking and revisionism to issues of security and conquest, or rather insecurity and territorial aggrandizement, with the analytical focus on either status quo or revisionism depending on what structural logic one adheres to; whether defensive realism or offensive realism, whether theorized as part of security-maximizing or powermaximizing behavior. 27 Various IR scholars have convincingly demonstrated that states want status, and have accentuated the importance of status, rather than security, in explaining revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo.28 However, their theoretical focus repeats the flaws of the various structural realist theories by only focusing on rising states and the link between status enhancement and revisionism, leaving the link between status maintenance and revisionism unexplored. This is problematic since “none of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo,” as Samuel Huntington succinctly points out. 29 Hence, status concerns relates to both rising and declining powers.

#### Retrenchment bolsters Chinese integrationists and moderates their foreign policy BUT hegemony ensures hawks take over and escalate Chinese aggression.

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The foreign policy preferences of China’s elite vary fairly widely. Shambaugh and Xiao have identified seven distinct orientations toward the status quo within Chinese foreign policy discourse. At the integrationist end of the spectrum are the Globalists, who believe that China should take on additional responsibility for global governance within the existing framework of institutions – in short, China should “act as a responsible power.”56 Chinese Globalists are much like Western “liberal institutionalists,” and are thus generally supportive of the liberal order. Five other perspectives (which Shambaugh and Xiao identify as Selective Multilateralists, the Global South school, the Asia Firsters, the Major Powers School, and the Realists) are less sold on the liberal order, but at least agree that some degree of participation in its institutions, norms, and rules is necessary.57

But there is one group – the Nativists – that rejects participation in the liberal international order. The Nativists are “hyper-nationalist” Marxist ideologues who oppose domestic reforms aimed at producing openness and market capitalism. In the realm of foreign policy, they oppose participation in the liberal order because they “view international multilateral involvement as ‘traps’ (laid by the West) to embroil China in costly overseas commitments.”58 Nativists have multiple reasons for rejecting integration, not all of which have to do with status – for instance, they worry that participation in the Western order will destabilize the Communist Party. But they are also deeply concerned about China’s status and are skeptical about the prospects of achieving their ambitions within an order dominated by Western powers. According to Shambaugh and Xiao, Nativists “regularly harp on the nationalist theme of the ‘century of shame and humiliation’ and argue that China is entitled to global respect (particularly by those powers that previously humiliated China).”59

Liu Mingfu’s sensationally popular China Dream is a remarkably open call for a deep revisionist challenge to the liberal order. While Liu may not be a Nativist (according to Shambaugh’s classification), his writing is worth considering as a modern Chinese manifestation of the kind of argument that Friedrich von Bernhardi popularized in Germany during the years before World War I. Liu’s central proposition is that China should aim to become a “champion” nation – the global top dog or leader (as distinct from the hegemon, which to Liu implies a form of imperialism and military domination). As the “champion,” China would “create a new world order that prefers peace, development, freedom, and cooperative civilization.” This seems like a clear demand for China to – at some point – remake the international order.

What is significant is the source of the demand for radical revisionism, and its implications for China’s participation in the liberal order. Liu links the need for a new order to the deficiencies of American hegemony, the “worst expression” of which is “its monopolization of its status as champion.”60 In other words, the United States will not accede willingly to China’s attainment of a position of equality in a “multipolar” world. The book goes on to document and decry American efforts to contain the rise of China, considers lessons fromthe successfulAmerican defeat of two other potential “champions” (the Soviet Union and Japan), and makes a clear argument against integrating too deeply within the liberal order:

However, it cannot be denied that America has a clear upper hand in terms of control and power with China. China can be promoted to copilot to help the United States cope with risks, but this will only help America maintain its position as pilot. America allows opponents to board its plane, which is ultimately a higher degree of control and containment.61

Integrating within the liberal order would amount to becoming Washington’s “copilot,” which would do nothing more than strengthen the basis of a status hierarchy that the United States is intent upon preserving. This is reminiscent of the way that Bernhardi, militant pan-Asianists, andWeimar nationalists argued against participation in the pre-WorldWar I and interwar orders. And Liu’s book is hardly peripheral: in 2013, Xi Jinping began invoking the term “China Dream” to describe his vision for China’s future, and has reportedly been deeply influenced by the book’s central argument.62

Nativists and other revisionists may not be ascendant in Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking, but their foreign policy preferences are not marginal either. While other schools of thought do not take such strident positions against participation in the liberal order, some share a sense of skepticism: Realists for instance, are also concerned that Western institutions are traps meant to keep China down.63 And Chinese elites remain worried about Chinese status and link it to the terms of participation in the liberal order – they emphasize “equality of participation” over “governance” and chafe at the idea of complying with American standards in order to be recognized as a “responsible power.”64

So while Chinese foreign policy is currently run mostly by proponents of intermediate and at least partially integrationist perspectives, Nativists and others like Liu constitute a loud and potentially influential voice for policies that reject the liberal international order – much like Pan-Asians or German radical nationalists spent the 1920s demanding policies of protest and delegitimation from the more moderate leaders who ran Taisho¯ and Weimar foreign policy.65 It is not difficult to imagine support for the Nativist perspective (not just among the elite but also in the public) growing along with developments that seem to confirm fears that Chinese status ambitions face an insurmountable, unjust obstacle imposed by the United States and the liberal order. Indeed, evidence suggests that Chinese “netizen” nationalists are hyper-aware of status issues and often mobilize in response to concerns about the way China is treated by foreign actors and what that treatment says about China’s international standing.66

Status, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Foreign Policy

The question that remains is whether – in China’s authoritarian system – pressure from outside the government for radical revisionist policies could have much influence. The government is (and likely will be for the foreseeable future) committed to foreign policy moderation: but what if developments appearing to confirm that China faces a status “glass ceiling” increase support for the Nativist position and lead to widespread demands for policies aimed at rejecting the liberal order? Could these forces impact Chinese policy in the same way that they impacted German and Japanese policy? It is hard to know for sure, but there is good reason to think that the government is susceptible to influence from external pressure and that it may only become more so in the future.

While some scholars maintain that Chinese policymakers mostly effectively ignore public opinion, or that public opinion prompts short-term shifts in official rhetoric or policy but does not influence grand strategic direction, many others agree that “bottom-up” forces play a significant role in Chinese foreign policy.67 Unofficial attitudes and preferences cannot influence policy through the mechanisms of electoral political competition, but this does not mean they are irrelevant. First, policy has to be at least somewhat responsive to the diversity of elite preferences – just as Bethmann Hollweg was constrained by the attitudes of the Kaiser, Tirpitz, and the Pan-Germans, Chinese leaders may be constrained by the preferences of Nativists and some status-sensitive and integration skeptical Realists in the military and the Party.68 Second, mass opinion can threaten China’s elite through the dynamics of widespread popular protest. According to Weiss, mass protests may menace ruling elites by creating demonstration effects, tipping points, and information cascades; facilitating future mobilization against the regime; and fostering or exacerbating divisions within the leadership.69 And while strong authoritarian states like China can prevent and manage anti-regime protests, there are costs and risks associated with doing so, especially when public opinion is aimed at forcing the regime to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy posture.70 This means that the masses can be a potent weapon for anyone interested in forcing the government into adopting a more belligerent foreign policy; in turn, this means that any factor that makes it easier to mobilize anti-Western opinion (such as apparent evidence that the United States is unwilling to accommodate a Chinese claim to equal rights) may provide opportunities for Chinese proponents of challenging the liberal order.

# 1NR

#### No diversionary war---rhetoric solves.

* Evidence on diversionary war is mixed at best
* They use hostile rhetoric instead of war to have their cake and eat it too – achieves same benefits without conflict
* Prefer our study because it’s based on 50,000 US diplomatic events classified by interstate interactions across economic crises

Carter 18, Assistant Professor, School of International Relations, University of Southern California. (Erin Baggott, 08/29/18, “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Unemployment and US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010”, www.erinbcarter.org/documents/diversionUS.pdf]

There is a large literature on diversionary conflict in international relations, but it focuses on material conflicts like militarized interstate disputes rather than foreign policy rhetoric. It is based in social identity theory, which suggests that leaders can increase ingroup affinity by making intergroup distinctions more salient (Closer, 1950; Simmel, 1955; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary conflict is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed” (Baum and Potte r, 2008, 48). Several studies find evidence of diversionary aggression in US foreign policy (Clark, 2003; DeRouen, 2000; DeRouen and Peake, 2002; Fordham, 1998a, 6; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; James and Hristoulas, 1994; James and Oneal, 1991; Levy, 1989«,fc; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Ostrom and Job, 1986) and elsewhere (Bennett, 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt, 1000; Davies, 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000; Gelpi, 1997; Heldt, 1999; Lebow, 1981; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Oneal and Tir, 2006; Russett, 1990; Sobek, 2007; Tir, 2010). Yet skeptics have amassed opposing evidence (Chiozza and Gormans, 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Gowa, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik, 2000, 2004; Meeraik and Waterman, 1996; Moore and Lanoue, 2003; Potter, 2007). Some cases are hard to reconcile with the theory: in Britain, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, and Kosovo wars (Lai and Reiter, 2005). Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth” (Meernik and Waterman, 1996).

Others have developed scope conditions for diversionary aggression. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), when leaders are accountable (Carter, 2018; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011), and in mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005). It is less likely when states avoid provoking troubled adversaries (Clark, 2003; Fordham, 2005; Leeds and Davis, 1997; Miller, 1999). Diversion appears more likely to produce a rally when supported by Security Council authorization (Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004), when the White House draws attention to a dispute (Baker and Oneal, 2001), and in conditions of media attention, popular leadership, divided government, non election years, and first terms (Colaresi, 2007). Most recently, scholars have asked whether diversion occurs outside democracies. They find some autocracies, especially single party regimes, divert as well (Carter, 2018; Pickering and Kisangani, 2011).

This study extends the logic of diversionary conflict to foreign policy rhetoric. There is surprisingly little research on rhetoric in international relations. The international relations literature deems talk “cheap” (Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005). The audience cost literature considers rhetoric meaningful, but only if it invokes audience costs through explicit, public threats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007). However, if foreign policy rhetoric can activate ingroup identity, then it may be appealing for leaders who wish to improve their ratings without incurring the substantial risks of militarized interstate disputes. While it might be “outlandish” for presidents to engage in the impeachable exercise of diversionary war (Meernik and Waterman, 1996), hostile foreign policy rhetoric is far less outlandish a risk.

To develop a theory of diversionary cheap talk, this paper draws upon research in political psychology and political communication. These literatures find persuasive evidence that elite statements influence citizen beliefs (Behr and Iyengar, 19s."); Bennett. Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Brody, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Jentleson, 1992; Zaller and Chiu, 2000). I draw on social identity theory to argue that diversionary cheap talk highlights intergroup differences between nations and leads citizens to evaluate their leader favorably. When a leader criticizes foreigners, she cues ingroup identity, which increases citizens’ social attachment to the nation and to herself as its leader. This is a “solidarity mechanism,” through which “[c]ollective group goals and common group identity are highlighted, norms of group-based altruism are strengthened, punishment and rejection of defectors are increased, and perceptions of the in-group and out-group are manipulated” (Halevy, Bernstein and Sagiv, 2008, 405).

The theory generates observable implications about when leaders use diversionary cheap talk and who they target. I follow the consensus in the diversionary conflict literature in focusing on poor economic conditions as the most important source of public disapproval for leaders. Low approval ratings limit leaders’ ability to advance their domestic agenda. Therefore, when the economy deteriorates, leaders will criticize foreign nations to improve their approval ratings and restore the political capital necessary for them to govern. Second, a key observation from social identity theory is that the depth of intergroup differences is important for group attachment. Therefore, consonant with recent empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature (McLaughlin and Prins, 2004), I expect diversionary rhetoric to be most effective when it targets threatening outgroups. In the context of foreign policy, these are best represented by historical adversaries. And finally, because diversionary cheap talk shifts the focus of political competition from the partisan to the international level, it has differential partisan effects. Because national identity cues widen the tent of the political ingroup, diversionary cheap talk is most effective at boosting support among the leader’s nonpartisans: liberal citizens for conservative leaders, and conservative citizens for liberal leaders.

I test these hypotheses with the American Diplomatic Dataset, an original record of over 50,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2010 drawn from New York Times articles on foreign affairs. I used tools from computational social science to classify bilateral interstate interactions into hundreds of specific types and four aggregate categories: verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, material cooperation, and material conflict. This is by far the most historically extensive event dataset. As such, it allows an exploration of US foreign policy behavior across a variety of administrations and economic crises.

I find robust evidence of diversionary cheap talk in US foreign policy. First, I establish that US presidents face incentives to divert verbally rather than materially: while militarized interstate dispute initiation does not affect presidential approval ratings, critical rhetoric about other nations is associated with increased ratings, especially among nonpartisans. Responding to this incentive, presidents between 1945 and 2010 typically diverted in the form of words, not deeds. Simulations indicate that as unemployment varied from its minimum to its maximum observed value, hostile foreign policy rhetoric nearly doubled, depending on the administration. Throughout this study, estimates are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States initiated, although findings are robust to a redefinition of conflict as events the United States participated in. The verbal statements in the dataset are high profile and likely to be noticed by the American public: all appeared in the headlines of the New York Times.

This study contributes to existing scholarship in several ways. First, it demonstrates that US foreign policy rhetoric responds significantly to domestic economic conditions. International relations scholars should therefore continue to focus more seriously on the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and in particular its relationship to domestic politics (Johnston, 2001, 2008; Kurizaki, 2007; Ramsay, 2011; Sartori, 2002, 2005; Trager, 2010, 2011, 201(i). The American Diplomacy Dataset will enable researchers to further explore the communicative aspects of foreign policy, and their relationships to material and economic factors, in more detail than existing datasets permit.

Second, this study contributes to the diversionary conflict literature by showing that in many cases where diversionary theory predicts conflict initiation, leaders instead choose rhetorical hostility. In this sense, leaders may have their cake and eat it too: They benefit from an ingroup rally without inviting an international crisis. The mixed empirical findings in the diversionary conflict literature may be partly due to the fact that existing scholarship considers only the most serious forms of diversion like militarized interstate disputes. It is possible that a wide range of diversionary behavior takes place at less extreme levels, such as the rhetorical hostility documented in this paper.1

**\*\*\*BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

In the language of the foreign policy substitutability literature (Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom and Reed, 2008; Most and Starr, 1984, 1989; Oakes, 2012), rhetorical hostility, like the development of new economic policies, may be seen as a substitute for diversionary conflict.

**\*\*\*END FOOTNOTE 1\*\*\***

#### 3---No correlation between economic decline and war.

Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”   
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

#### Their evidence agrees---their emerging tech evidence says governance now---it’s written in present tense---it’s ALL status quo descriptive! [KU=yellow]

Michael 1AC Spiro 20. JD from the University of Washington School of Law, an L.L.M. in Innovation and Technology Law from Seattle University School of Law. Corporate counsel at Smartsheet Inc. “The FTC and AI Governance: A Regulatory Proposal.” Seattle Journal of Seattle Journal of Technology Environmental & Innovation Law. Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 2. 12-19-2020. https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=sjteil

Despite these limitations, the FTC has a formidable reputation as an enforcement authority, and commercial entities, and their lawyers, pay close attention to its orders and decisions.248 For example, when the FTC issues a complaint, it is published on the FTC’s website, which often generates significant attention in the privacy community.249 One reason for this is the fear firms have of the FTC’s auditing process, which not only is “exhaustive and demanding,” but can last for as long as 20 years.250 As such, the FTC settles most of the enforcement actions it initiates.251 Firms are motivated to settle with the FTC because they can avoid having to admit any wrongdoing in exchange for taking remedial measures, and thus they also avoid the costs to their reputation from apologizing.252

Though done by necessity, the rule-making process the FTC engages in with its consent orders and settlement agreements can be of benefit when regulating emerging technologies. 253 For one, it allows the flexibility needed to adapt to new and rapidly changing situations.254 Further, the FTC can wait and see if an industry consensus develops around a particular standard before codifying that rule through its enforcement actions.255 As with the common law, which has long demonstrated the ability to adjust to technological changes iteratively, the FTC’s incremental case-bycase approach can help minimize the risks of producing incorrect or inappropriate regulatory policy outcomes.256

In addition to its use of consent orders and settlement agreements, the FTC has created a type of “soft law” by issuing guidelines, press releases, workshops, and white papers.257 Unlike in enforcement actions, where the FTC looks at a company’s conduct and sees how its behavior compares to industry standards, the FTC arrives at the best practices it develops for guidance purposes through a “deep and ongoing engagement with all stakeholders.”258 As such, not only is the FTC’s authority broad enough to regulate the use of emerging technologies such as AI in commerce, but the FTC’s enforcement actions also constitute a body of jurisprudence the FTC can rely on to address the real and potential harms that stem from the deployment of consumeroriented AI.259

Given its broad grant of authority, the regulatory tools at its disposal, and its experience dealing with emerging technologies, the FTC is currently in the best position to take the lead in regulating AI. The FTC’s leadership is sorely needed to fill in the remaining – and quite large – gaps in those few sectoral laws that specifically address AI and algorithmic decision-making.260 Several factors make the FTC the ideal agency for this role. First, the FTC can use its broad Section 5 powers to respond rapidly and nimbly to the types of unanticipated regulatory issues AI is likely to create.261

Second, the FTC has an established history of approaching emerging technologies with “a light regulatory touch” during their beginning stages, waiting to increase its regulatory efforts only once the technology has become more established.262 This approach provides the innovative space needed for new technologies such as AI to develop to their full potential. Thus, as it has in the past, the FTC would focus on disclosure requirements rather than conduct prohibition, and take a case-by-case approach rather than rely on rulemaking.263 Also, as it has traditionally done, the FTC can hold public events on consumer-related AI and issue reports and white papers to guide industry.264

In other words, the FTC has long taken a co-regulatory approach to regulation, which it can and should proceed to do with AI. As in other emerging technology areas, this will help industry continue to grow and innovate, while allowing for the calibration among all relevant stakeholders of the “appropriate expectations” concerning the use and deployment of AI decision-making systems.265 At the same time, the FTC should use its regulatory powers to nudge, and when necessary, push companies to refrain from engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices in the design and deployment of AI systems.266 The FTC should also place the onus on firms that design and implement those systems to ensure misplaced or unrealistic consumer expectations about AI are corrected.267

By nudging (or pushing) firms in this way, the FTC can “gradually impose a set of sticky default practices that companies can only deviate from if they very explicitly notify consumers.”268 In terms of disclosure requirements, as it has done in other contexts, the FTC can develop rules and guidelines for “when and how a company must disclose information to avoid deception and protect a consumer from harm,” which can include requiring firms to adopt the equivalent of a privacy policy. 269 Given the black box like nature of most algorithmic decision-making processes, there is much that AI developers might have to disclose to prevent those processes from being deemed unfair or deceptive.270

In addition, given its broad authority under Section 5, the FTC is able to address small, nuanced changes in AI design that could adversely affect consumers, but that other areas of law, such as tort, may not be able to adequately handle.271 Again, this is important because AI and algorithmic decision-making can pose profound and systemic risks of harm, even though the actual harm to individual consumers may be small or hard to quantify. And as it has done in the area of privacy, the FTC can become the de facto federal agency authority charged with protecting consumers from harms caused by AI systems and other algorithmic decisionmaking processes.272

The FTC also can, and should, seek to work with other agencies to address AI-related harms, given that the regulatory efforts of other agencies will still occur and be needed in specific sectors or industries, which would impact and be relevant to the FTC’s efforts as well.273 Agency cooperation is essential to ensuring regulatory consistency, accuracy, and efficiency in the type of complex, varied technological landscape that AI presents.274 This should not be a problem as the FTC’s Section 5 authority overlaps regularly with the authority of other agencies, and the FTC itself has a history of cooperating with those agencies.275 Further, the FTC can use its experience working with other agencies to build standards and policy consensus within the regulatory community and among stakeholders. 276

The overarching role the FTC has played in protecting consumer privacy within the United States also has given it legitimacy within the wider privacy community. The FTC has been pivotal over time in promoting international confidence in the United States’ ability to regulate privacy by for example acting as the essential mechanism for enforcing the Safe Harbor Agreement with the European Union.277 As it takes on a similar overarching regulatory role for AI and algorithmic decision-making processes in this country, the FTC should gain a similar level of legitimacy internationally. This is important given the increasingly cross border nature of AI research and development.

#### FTC dedicating substantial resources to fighting fraud now. Status quo rulemaking heightens penalties.

FTC 12-16-2021 (“FTC Launches Rulemaking to Combat Sharp Spike in Impersonation Fraud,” <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/12/ftc-launches-rulemaking-combat-sharp-spike-impersonation-fraud>)

The Federal Trade Commission launched a rulemaking today aimed at combatting government and business impersonation fraud, a pernicious and prevalent problem that has grown worse during the pandemic. Impersonators use all methods of communication to trick their targets into trusting that they are the government or an established business and then trade on this trust to steal their identity or money. The COVID-19 pandemic has spurred a sharp spike in impersonation fraud, as scammers capitalize on confusion and concerns around shifts in the economy stemming from the pandemic. Incorporating new data from the Social Security Administration, reported costs have increased an alarming 85 percent year-over year, with $2 billion in total losses between October 2020 and September 2021. Notably, since the pandemic began, COVID-specific scam reports have included 12,491 complaints of government impersonation and 8,794 complaints of business impersonation. “It is reprehensible that scammers are preying on people during this pandemic by pretending to be someone they can trust,” said Samuel Levine, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “The sharp spike in impersonation scams has cost our country billions and undermined response and relief efforts. The FTC is prepared to use every tool in our toolbox to deter government and business impersonation fraud, penalize wrongdoers, and return money to those harmed.” Government and business impersonators can take many forms, posing as, for example, a lottery official, a government official or employee, or a representative from a well-known business or charity. Impersonators may also use implicit representations, such as misleading domain names and URLs and “spoofed” contact information, to create an overall net impression of legitimacy. These scammers are fishing for information they can use to commit identity theft or seek monetary payment, often requesting funds via wire transfer, gift cards, or increasingly cryptocurrency. Government impersonators typically assert an air of authority to stage their scam. These impersonators sometimes threaten their target with severe consequences such as a discontinuation of benefits, enforcement of tax liability, and even arrest or prosecution. Government impersonators have also been known to deceive consumers into paying for services that would otherwise be free, or to lure them with promises of government grants, prizes, or loan forgiveness. Business impersonators typically get consumers’ attention with emails, telephone calls or text messages about suspicious activity on consumers’ accounts or computers or supposed good news about a refund or prize in hopes of gaining trust and receiving personal information. The harm is substantial, as people who lose money on the leading business impersonator scams report an individual median loss of $1,000. In the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), the FTC is seeking comment from the public on a wide range of questions about these schemes. The ANPR outlines the extensive data the Commission has collected related to these types of impersonation scams, drawn largely from the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network database of fraud reports, and its law enforcement experience in this area. The FTC has brought numerous cases against government and business impersonation schemes through the years under its existing authorities, but the ANPR notes that the Commission’s authority to seek consumer redress or civil penalties in these cases is currently very limited. The provisions related to impersonation under the Telemarketing Sales Rule and Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule cover only specific sectors or methods of scams. This is the first rulemaking initiated under the Commission’s streamlined rulemaking procedures. A potential rule resulting from the ANPR could allow the FTC to seek strong relief for consumers across a broad array of government and business impersonation cases, which is especially important following the Supreme Court’s ruling in AMG Capital Management LLC v. FTC. If, after reviewing the public comments in response to the ANPR, the Commission decides to proceed with proposing such a trade regulation rule, its next step would be to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking.

#### Divergence from the consumer welfare standard now is unfounded and doesn’t thump. It’s all talk. Data about actual enforcement proves merger enforcement is in steady decline.

Wait and Roter 2-1-2022, \*JD, former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) lawyer advises deal makers and litigants, \*\*JD, associate in the Washington, DC office where she is a member of the Antitrust and Competition group at NRF (Amanda and Leslie, “Data On Biden's Tough Antitrust Stance Paints Subtler Picture,” *Law 360*)

U.S. antitrust authorities have publicly decried the growth of dominant companies and have announced initiatives to increase merger enforcement and conduct more rigorous merger reviews. But looking behind the rhetoric to the data shows that enforcement may not be increasing as much as companies may fear — at least not yet.

What we are seeing, however, are administrative and substantive changes that are leading to longer and more burdensome reviews.

The Rhetoric

This past year has heralded an evolution in competition policy as antitrust law remained a prominent part of public discourse. On July 9, 2021, President Joe Biden signed a sweeping executive order that called for antitrust agencies to more aggressively scrutinize proposed mergers and acquisitions in certain major sectors, including energy, health care and technology.[1]

Multiple bills were introduced in Congress and in state legislatures that, if passed, would significantly alter antitrust law and affect its enforcement.[2] Most significantly, new leadership took office at both of the U.S. antitrust agencies, with Lina Khan becoming chair of the Federal Trade Commission and Jonathan Kanter heading the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

We have already seen sweeping changes in antitrust enforcement practices. Even before Khan's confirmation to the FTC, both the FTC and DOJ indefinitely suspended grants of early terminations of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act waiting period in February 2021.[3]

Once Khan assumed office in June 2021, the FTC rescinded numerous other long-standing merger enforcement policies and implemented new protocols. For example, in August 2021, the FTC began issuing preconsummation warning letters to parties in several transactions in which it did not complete its investigation within the HSR waiting period.[4]

The agency also announced that it was broadening the scope of second requests, which could include investigating noncompetition concerns,[5] rescinded its adherence to the vertical merger guidelines and other informal agency guidance,[6] and announced more stringent requirements on parties obtaining consent decrees.[7]

While the DOJ has not implemented the same new practices adopted by the FTC, the division is signaling a move toward more aggressive merger enforcement. Together with the FTC, the DOJ launched a public review of the horizontal merger guidelines to inform their consideration of potential revisions and updates.[8]

Further, Kanter recently stated in remarks to the New York State Bar Association's antitrust law section that "merger remedies short of blocking a transaction too often miss the mark."[9] He advised that "full weight must be given to preserving competition that already exists in a market," which "will often mean that we cannot accept anything less than an injunction blocking the merger — full stop."[10]

The Data

Yet with all this attention to antitrust merger enforcement, we are not seeing a commensurate increase in enforcement. At least not yet.

Mergers and acquisition activity that is reportable to the FTC and DOJ pursuant to the HSR Act has increased dramatically over the past decade. According to the FTC and DOJ's HSR annual reports, the number of adjusted transactions reported under the HSR Act increased from 1,414 in fiscal year 2011 to 2,030 in fiscal year 2019, seeing a decline during the fiscal year 2020 pandemic, and then rebounding to 3,644 in fiscal year 2021.[11]

Yet, the number of mergers challenged as a percentage of these reported transactions has remained fairly consistent at about 2% to 3% of all adjusted reported transactions over the past 10 years. In fact, the number of challenged transactions appears to have actually decreased in fiscal year 2021 — both in terms of the number of transactions challenged and as a percentage of the adjusted reported transactions.

By our count, the FTC challenged only 15 transactions in fiscal year 2021 — about half of the number of challenges the year before — whereas the DOJ challenged about the same number of transactions — 14 or 15 — as the prior year.